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THE ROAD TO PARIS RUNS THROUGH DELAWARE:
CLIMATE LITIGATION AND DIRECTORS’ DUTIES
Lisa Benjamin*
Abstract
As political and regulatory battles over climate change rage in the
United States, and the Trump Administration unwinds regulation on
climate change, the directors of some of the largest fossil fuel
corporations, often referred to as “carbon-majors,” are facing a barrage
of climate litigation claims. This is the second time directors of these
corporations have faced litigation. The first wave of litigation against
carbon majors failed for a number of reasons, including judicial
reluctance to engage with the complex issue of climate change. However,
climate litigation is evolving. In this second wave of litigation, judges have
started to engage more directly with new scientific processes that link
specific industry polluters to global climate impacts. Litigants are also
becoming more creative, attempting to avoid federal displacement
arguments encountered in the first wave by focusing on state-based
common law and statutory claims. The number and scope of claims have
also increased, with litigants moving beyond tort-based claims to employ
diverse causes of action, including ones arising under corporate law. This
second wave of litigation will have two implications for corporate law
directors’ duties. First, the litigation highlights the bidirectional nature of
climate impacts and risks. Corporations contribute emissions to the
atmosphere, which increase the severity of climate-related impacts. Those
impacts, in turn, pose significant risks to corporations themselves. Second,
the litigation elevates the risk profile of climate change from an ethical
concern to a significant financial risk that directors are legally obligated
to consider in order to comply with their directors’ duties under current
corporate law doctrine. This broad but sudden shift in litigation trends
changes the risk equation for directors with respect to climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change has become the defining issue of this generation. Scientific
assessments have become more and more definitive regarding anthropogenic
climate change and the severity of its impacts.1 The window to avoid runaway
1
See LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
[IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds.,
2008), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/6SCF-4M4B] (“There is very high confidence that the net effect of human activities
since 1750 has been one of warming.”); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
[IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2, 4, 8
(2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AV2R-87QJ] (providing a report on a number of environmental factors
including: atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide [being]
unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years;” “[w]arming of the climate system is
unequivocal;” and “[c]ontinued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming
and long-lasting changes . . . increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible
impacts for people and ecosystems.”), [hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014]; Kendra
Pierre-Louis, Ocean Warming Is Accelerating Faster Than Thought, New Research Finds,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/climate/ocean-warming-
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climate change is closing quickly.2 In 2015, almost 200 countries made
commitments under the Paris Agreement in relation to climate change.3
The United States was a largely progressive actor in the Paris Agreement
negotiations.4 The subsequent change in administration has reversed the course of
the United States in relation to climate change, with President Trump submitting a
notice to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement and unwinding
domestic regulation and policies on climate change.5 Perhaps due to this regulatory
climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/YW28-DZDW] (“[T]he world’s oceans are warming
far more quickly than previously thought . . . .”); Brett Molina, ‘Dangerous’ Antarctic
Glacier Has a Hole Roughly Two-Thirds Area of Manhattan, Scientists Warn, USA TODAY
(Jan. 31, 2019, 7:38 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2019/01/31/thwaitesglacier-antarctica-melting-could-impact-sea-levels-nasa/2729840002/ [https://perma.cc/G3
R6-3ZAU] (“Thwaites has been described as one of the world’s most dangerous glaciers
because its demise could lead to rapid changes in global sea levels.”); Mario Picazo, Ocean
Heat Waves Are Becoming More Severe and Frequent, WEATHER NETWORK (Mar. 12, 2019,
3:14
PM),
https://www.theweathernetwork.com/ca/news/article/ocean-heatwavesbecoming-more-frequent-severe-scientists-say-kelp-krill [https://perma.cc/2UWK-KTC8]
(“Earth’s atmosphere has been getting warmer over the past century, [and] our oceans have
also shown signs of unprecedented warming . . . .”).
2
See Myles Allen et al., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC],
Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT 12
(V. Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019
/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B8Q-GK4D] (stating that in
order to have a reasonable chance of not exceeding a 1.5˚C temperature increase, emissions
must decrease by “45% from 2010 levels by 2030”).
3
See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9.Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) (agreeing “to hold the
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2˚C”).
4
Karl Mathieson & Fiona Harvey, Climate Coalition Breaks Cover in Paris to Push
for Binding and Ambitious Deal, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 3:19 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/08/coalition-paris-push-for-bindingambitious-climate-change-deal [https://perma.cc/5X55-PBHT] (finding the United States
formed part of the “high ambition coalition” which pushed for including the 1.5˚C
aspirational temperature goal).
5
See Chris Wold, Climate Change, Presidential Power, and Leadership: “We Can’t
Wait,” 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 303, 304–07 (2012) (noting that even though the Obama
Administration demonstrated some progressive action on climate change, the issue was not
pursued with sufficient urgency and the action that was taken was done primarily through
executive action which is vulnerable to changing administrations); Juliet Eilperin, Trump
Administration Proposes Rule to Relax Carbon Limits on Power Plants, WASH. POST (Aug.
21, 2018, 8:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trumpadministration-proposes-rule-to-relax-carbon-limits-on-power-plants/2018/08/21/b46b0a8a
-a543-11e8-a656-943eefab5daf_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 2N5N-2LZL] (explaining that
the current administration has been undoing previous regulatory progress on climate change);
Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Submits Formal Notice of Withdrawal from Paris Climate Pact,
REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017, 3:25), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris/u-ssubmits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM [https://
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void, the battle around climate change has shifted to the courts, and this shift has
important implications for directors of fossil fuel-intensive (or carbon-major)
corporations.6
Carbon-major corporations have faced a deluge of claims in recent years. Cities
and municipalities from around the United States, including New York City,7
Oakland and San Francisco,8 San Mateo,9 Marin County,10 City of Imperial Beach,11

perma.cc/P5VD-LD3E] (reporting on the State Department informing the United Nations
that the United States will withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement); Edward Wong,
Trump Has Called Climate Change a Chinese Hoax. Beijing Says It Is Anything But., N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/world/asia/china-trumpclimate-change.html [https://perma.cc/5PPT-TD7N] (explaining that Donald J. Trump has
consistently questioned the legitimacy of climate science); Emily Holden, ‘It’ll Change
Back’: Trump Says Climate Change Not a Hoax, but Denies Lasting Impact, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 15, 2018, 1:48 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/15/itll-changeback-trump-says-climate-change-not-a-hoax-but-denies-lasting-impact [https://perma.cc/
MSK8-SUKS] (finding that President Trump is continuing to question climate science and
climate change); David M. Ulhmann, The Trump Administration’s Orwellian SAFE Vehicles
Rule, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/the-trumpadministrations-orwellian-safe-vehicles-rule/ [https://perma.cc/LT8A-HJLC] (discussing
“President Trump’s refusal to acknowledge the dangers of climate change and his dystopian
zeal for undoing Obama-era environmental protection rules”); Oliver Milman, ‘It’s a Ghost
Page’: EPA Site’s Climate Change Section May Be Gone for Good, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1,
2018, 3:32 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/01/epa-website-climatechange-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/7CRK-4P67] (“The EPA under the Trump
administration has attempted to roll back all key measures designed to address climate
change . . . .”).
6
See The Urgenda Climate Case Against the Dutch Government, URGENDA,
https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case [https://perma.cc/4KDW-YM69] (last
visited Oct 8, 2019) (stating that there is a global shift in climate litigation trends with a
number of suits being launched, in particular against Governments by their citizens in Europe
and the United States); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016),
rev’d and remanded, No.18-36082 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2020); Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan
(2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Pak.) (challenging “the inaction, delay and lack of seriousness
on the part of the Federal Government and the Government of the Punjab to address the
challenges and to meet the vulnerabilities associated with Climate Change.”).
7
David Hasemyer, Fossil Fuels on Trial: Where the Major Climate Change Lawsuits
Stand Today, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 8, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/04
042018/climate-change-fossil-fuel-company-lawsuits-timeline-exxon-children-californiacities-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/8HVS-GH4M] (detailing the “wave of legal
challenges . . . washing over the oil and gas industry, demanding accountability for climate
change, [which] started as a ripple after revelations that ExxonMobil had long recognized
the threat fossil fuels pose to the world”).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.

2020]

ROAD TO PARIS RUNS THROUGH DELAWARE

317

County of Santa Cruz,12 City of Santa Cruz13 and the City of Richmond in
California,14 King County in Washington,15 the State of Rhode Island,16 the City and
Mayor of Baltimore,17 the City and County of Honolulu,18 as well as crab fishermen
in California and Oregon,19 have all initiated claims against carbon-major
corporations. In addition to nuisance-based claims, corporate law fiduciary duties
have also been in play, with an initial decision holding that directors of ExxonMobil
should have disclosed relevant information on climate risk to shareholders.20
Together these new cases constitute the second wave of corporate climate
litigation.21
This second wave of litigation highlights a broader set of risks that face carbonmajor corporations. New scientific processes are able to quantify the historical
proportion of climate impacts and damages for which carbon-major corporations are
responsible.22 As the science progresses, it is likely that new and better-grounded
legal challenges against carbon-majors will escalate. Judges are overcoming their
12

Id.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
City and County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20-0000380 (Haw. Cir. Ct,
1st Cir., filed Mar. 9, 2020).
19
Dana Drugmand, Commercial Fishermen Sue Fossil Fuel Industry for Climate
Impacts, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/
2018/11/15/fisheries-crab-climate-change-liability/
[https://perma.cc/G97Q-ZQSY]
(“Crabbers in California and Oregon have suffered significant economic losses and are
seeking to hold fossil fuel companies accountable . . . .”).
20
Karen Savage, Federal Judge: Employees Can Pursue Climate Fraud Suit Against
Exxon, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/
2018/08/15/climate-fraud-suit-exxon-employees-ramirez/ [https://perma.cc/T2AL-THE8]
(discussing misrepresentations made about climate change).
21
See Martin Olszynski et al., From Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons from Tobacco for
the Future of Climate Change Liability, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2017); Geetanjali
Ganguly et al., If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change, 38
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841, 842 (2018) (identifying a second wave of corporate climate
litigation). An earlier “first wave” of climate litigation in the United States against
corporations floundered for two primary reasons. First, courts viewed climate change as
properly within the domain of federal regulation, and held that the federal Clean Air Act
displaced climate change claims brought under federal common law tort. See generally Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). Second, plaintiffs struggled to prove
causation and judges were reluctant to engage with climate science. Id. at 428. At the time,
science could not link a specific company’s emissions to a specific plaintiff’s damages. Even
if tort was appropriate, then, it was unclear that plaintiffs could prevail, and so this first wave
of climate litigation failed.
22
See Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions
to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, CLIMATIC CHANGE 229 (2013).
13
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prior hesitancy and engaging more directly with new scientific processes and
outcomes. Litigants are also attempting to overcome federal displacement hurdles23
that posed a barrier to successful outcomes in the first wave of litigation by
grounding their claims more closely in state-based common law and statutory
offenses.24 Even if these renewed litigation efforts experience setbacks or are
ultimately unsuccessful, corporations are likely to be the subject of increased
regulatory and public scrutiny as a result.25 Public opinion on climate change is
already shifting, with the majority of Americans now “alarmed” or “concerned”
about the issue.26 Changing public opinion could shift political approaches to the
issue, and incentivize federal regulatory action as already evidenced by the

23

In the first wave of climate litigation, judges deferred to federal statutes such as the
Clean Air Act, holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law public nuisance
actions. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424; see also infra Section II.A. In the second
wave, litigants are relying on state-based claims but are facing preemption hurdles. Federal
preemption is contained in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution art. IV § 1. The
two cornerstones of preemption are the purpose of Congress and a presumption against state
action where Congress has already legislated. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
The common law has established two types of federal preemption: express preemption,
where a federal statute explicitly states that state law is preempted; and implicit preemption,
where there is no explicit preemption. Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View
from the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2010). Federal statutes can reserve state
action and protect it from federal preemption by the use of savings clauses. The Clean Air
Act has such a savings clause which has been an issue in the second wave of climate
litigation. See infra note 133 and infra Section II.E.
24
See infra Section II.E.
25
See Sophie Marjanac et al., Acts of God, Human Influence and Litigation, 10 NATURE
GEOSCIENCE 616, 616 (2017); Ganguly et al., supra note 21, at 842; Olszynski et al., supra
note 21, at 21.
26
Abel Gustafson et al., Americans Are Increasingly “Alarmed” About Global
Warming, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/americans-are-increasingly-alarmedabout-global-warming/ [https://perma.cc/R6H9-VZ2U] (noting that six in ten Americans are
either alarmed or concerned about climate change, with the proportion of Americans alarmed
about climate change doubling from 2013 to 2018); although almost half of Americans are
unwilling to pay for climate policies. See Adam Aton, Most Americans Want Climate Change
Policies, SCI. AM. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/mostamericans-want-climate-change-policies/ [https://perma.cc/5MMB-U6PT] (noting that in a
2017 poll 7 out of 10 Americans believed climate change was happening but half would be
unwilling to pay even $1.00 more on their electricity bills to lower emissions).
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introduction of the Green New Deal in Congress,27 and renewed efforts by
Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives on climate legislation.28
This second wave of litigation has important implications for directors of
carbon-major corporations as it highlights the risks of climate change to corporations
and the financial implications of those risks. The risks of climate change have
become so great that they threaten corporate profits and international fiscal
stability.29 Directors must consider the financial implications of climate risks in
order to comply with their fiduciary duties. Risks to corporations include transition
and physical risks. Transition risks are those risks associated with the transition to a
lower-carbon economy, such as policy or regulatory changes, as well as litigation,
technology, market changes, and reputational risk.30 Physical risks affect operational
assets and supply chains and are driven by both slow impacts of climate change,
such as a rising sea-level, as well as extreme weather events, such as droughts,
wildfires, storms, and flooding. Risks specific to the energy industry include water

27
While light on detail at the moment, the Green New Deal proposal puts forward a
series of actions to address both climate change and economic inequality, by decarbonizing
the electricity grid, transportation systems, and industry. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong.
(2019).
28
Ari Natter & Anna Edgerton, Pelosi Says House to Revisit Climate Bill Based on
2009 Bill, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2019, 10:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic
les/2019-01-04/pelosi-says-house-to-revisit-climate-plan-based-on-2009-bill-jqiapimq
[https://perma.cc/BL4J-RU2L].
29
Mark Carney, in his position as the Governor of the Bank of England, highlighted
the potential risks of climate change to both industries and international fiscal stability. He
noted that climate change could negatively affect between four to forty-three trillion dollars
of global assets by the end of the century. See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE
COST OF INACTION: RECOGNIZING THE VALUE AT RISK FROM CLIMATE CHANGE (2015),
https://eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/The%20cost%20of%20inaction_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6X2E-MYLK]. Carney’s 2015 speech to insurers in Lloyds of London
stated that the risks of climate change are threefold: physical risks to insured assets, liability
risks from litigation, and transition risks, including financial risks from changing regulatory
requirements to transition to a lower-carbon economy. He also highlighted the role of initial
law suits against pension fund managers of carbon major companies in elevating long-term
risks of climate change and their implications for fiduciary duties. His speech at Lloyds of
London in 2015 was the precursor to the establishment of the Task Force on Climate-Related
Financial Disclosures by the G-20. Nina Chestney, G20 Task Force Issues Framework for
Climate-Related Financial Disclosure, REUTERS (Jun 29, 2017, 12:08 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-financial-disclosure/g20-task-force-issue
s-framework-for-climate-related-financial-disclosure-idUSKBN19K0JW [https://perma.cc/
39VU-TXW2].
30
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 5 (2017),
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-TCFD-Report-062817.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R2PY-QGWM].

320

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

shortages, melting permafrost affecting transportation routes, and damage to coastal
energy infrastructure.31
Despite these risks, directors, officers, and their legal advisors justifiably may
have been, and continue to be, operating under the view that corporate fiduciary
duties either prevent or disincentivize directors from focusing corporate attention
and resources on combatting climate change. In accordance with this view, some
directors will have hesitated or declined to assess and address climate-related risks.32
This is largely due to corporate law focusing almost exclusively on shareholders and
shareholder profits.33 Directors’ fiduciary duties are duties imposed by statute and
common law on directors, and owed by directors primarily to the corporation.34 The
shareholder wealth maximization norm is a powerful norm that has guided the
interpretation of directors’ duties under corporate law for many decades.35 Like
corporate law, it places shareholders, and their perceived need for profit
maximization, at the heart of directors’ duties.
This Article takes a different perspective and urges a contrary approach.
Corporations will face increased legal responsibility as climate science improves,
climate impacts escalate in frequency and severity, corporations and the public face
increased risks, and public opinion shifts. Corporate fiduciary duties and the
shareholder wealth maximization norm that guides their application compel
directors to identify and assess the risks of climate change to the corporation, and
may even incentivize directors to address these risks, particularly if they take a longterm management approach. While short-term business perspectives may still pose
barriers to progressive climate action, new research is pointing to a business case for
transitioning away from fossil fuels and towards cleaner energy sources, even for
the largest carbon-major corporations. Businesses are also failing to address climateinduced risks and damage in the short-term as well. The business case for climate
action, combined with the increased risks of climate change to corporations, should
spur progressive action, even as fiduciary duties are interpreted under Delaware law
31

Infra Section IV.A. Climate change impacts will be felt across economies, and
impacts will be differentiated across sectors. See Sarah Barker, An Introduction to Directors’
Duties in Relation to Stranded Asset Risks, in STRANDED ASSETS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
RISKS, RESILIENCE AND OPPORTUNITY 202 (Routledge 2018). Even within the fossil fuel
industry some sectors have already been affected differently, with bankruptcies seen
throughout the coal industry.
32
See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://nyti.ms/1LSk9ku [https://perma.cc/XZT8-TC3G].
33
Id.
34
For example, the Model Business Corporation Act states that all directors shall act in
good faith and in a manner that the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of
the corporation. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8:30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). Likewise,
Tennessee law states that directors shall discharge all duties in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18301(a) (2019).
35
See Joan Hemingway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes,
Decisional Law and Organic Documents, 74 WASH & LEE L AW REV. 939, 950–56 (2017).
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(where most carbon-major corporations are headquartered). A climate-friendly
approach should be viewed by directors not only as a response to risk, but also as
part of a strategy to adapt to climate impacts in the short, medium, and long-term,
and ensure profitability for shareholders.
Corporate action, moreover, is essential for dramatic and much-needed
contributions to meeting global climate goals under the Paris Agreement. As
Vandenbergh and Gilligan note, private environmental governance and corporate
actions can achieve major greenhouse gas emission reductions in the face of
government gridlock.36 Corporate law can be an important tool to facilitate
progressive climate action by corporations.37 Identifying corporate law as a bridge
and not a barrier to ambitious corporate climate action, therefore, has broad
relevance. This Article illustrates that the road to meeting the Paris Agreement’s
climate goals could, in fact, run through Delaware-based corporate law.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I describes why climate change poses
difficulties for corporate law, and why carbon-majors are the focus of renewed
litigation efforts. Part II charts the evolving nature of climate litigation against these
actors, including hurdles encountered in the tort-based first wave of climate
litigation, and how the second wave of litigation is attempting to overcome these
hurdles.38 Part III examines new risks and responsibilities thrown up by this second
36

Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 217, 220 (2015) (identifying private environmental governance as actions by
private organizations performed without government collaboration, delegation or
outsourcing). In the existing government gridlock, Vandenbergh and Gilligan explain that
while private actions are a second-best option to government action, these activities are
critical and could reduce emissions by roughly 1,000 million tons of CO2 per year between
2016-2025. Id.; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, THE DRIVERS OF CORPORATE CLIMATE
MITIGATION, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 29 (2018); Michael P. Vandenbergh, PRIVATE
ACTORS: PART OF THE PROBLEM, PART OF THE SOLUTION, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM
48 (2017).
37
See generally Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71
STAN. L. REV. 137 (2019) (arguing that corporate law should in fact be understood as a
fundamental part of environmental law).
38
This Article eschews a comprehensive comparative survey of climate litigation
around the globe, as this work has already been undertaken by other scholars. See, e.g., David
Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012); UN ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME, THE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GLOBAL REVIEW (2017),
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/05/Burger-Gundlach-2017-05-UN-Envt-CC-Liti
gation.pdf [https://perma.cc/BNT5-JPLH]; DENA P. ADLER, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL SABIN
CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN THE AGE OF
TRUMP: YEAR ONE (2018), https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/d8-dg03cm33 [https://perma.cc/E43C-F6R9]; Brian J. Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part 1),
2011 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 3 [hereinafter Preston, (Part 1)]; Brian J. Preston, Climate
Change Litigation (Part 2), 2011 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 244 [hereinafter Preston,
(Part 2)]; R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change and
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wave of litigation by providing a synthesis of directors’ duties under Delaware law
and highlighting how these developments in climate litigation may (and should)
affect corporate behavior in the context of climate risk. It also examines potential
barriers to climate liability. Part IV charts a potential way forward for directors,
highlighting the management tools and strategies that are available to them.
I. THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR CORPORATE LAW
Climate change poses significant issues for legal structures and governance.
Climate change is highly polycentric, dynamic, uncertain, and socio-politically
sensitive, and so poses challenges to legal orders which seek certainty and stability.39
The structure of the law is subdivided into specific levels of governance and
therefore is ineffective in governing a problem such as climate change, which has
impacts on local, regional, and international scales.40 Climate change has been
described as a “super wicked” policy problem,41 as it poses challenges to legal orders
that are designed to create and maintain legal stability for traditional governance
regimes.42
In addition, climate science is a particularly complex discipline. It involves
elements of risk, probability, and, therefore, uncertainty. There are uncertain
temporal delays between emissions and effects. And since it is impossible to run

the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 295 (2017); Michael C. Blumm
& Mary Cristina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process and the
Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2017); JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY,
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY (2015). This
Article focuses instead on the potential impacts of this litigation on corporations generally
and on the nexus between climate risk and directors’ fiduciary duties more specifically, as
this is an under researched area of law in climate litigation scholarship. See generally Joana
Setzer & Lisa C. Vanhala, Climate Change litigation: A Review of Research on Courts and
Litigants in Climate Governance, 10 WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEW: CLIMATE CHANGE
580 (2019) (identifying 130 articles on climate change litigation published between 200 and
2018 in order to understand and better situate emerging themes of climate change litigation).
It is important to note that corporations themselves are not passive players in this arena and
have been active in litigation efforts, acting as plaintiffs in a number of suits. It is also
important to note that some corporations have been progressive and proactive in the climate
change arena, and so not all carbon-major corporations can be classed as “laggards.”
However, this Article focuses on a small subset of cases where carbon major corporations
are defendants in order to assess the implications of these cases for directors’ fiduciary duties.
39
Elizabeth Fisher et al., The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change, 80 MOD.
L. REV. 173, 174 (2017).
40
Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal
Regulatory Role, 49 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 586, 591 (2009).
41
Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009).
42
Fisher et al., supra note 39, at 176.
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controlled experiments, the discipline is heavily dependent upon climate models.43
As Fisher et al. note, “[t]he dynamic nature of climate change does not sit easily with
legal orders that value stability and legal certainty.”44 These are difficult areas for
judges to wrap their arms around and may explain previous judicial reticence in
engaging with climate change and climate science in particular.
A. The Failure of Corporate Law to Address Climate Change
Climate change challenges legal orders, and this dynamic is further highlighted
within the realm of corporate law and its application to carbon-major corporations.
Corporate law is traditionally designed to focus on shareholders and profit-making,
with non-shareholders being relegated to the realm of environmental law or some
other non-corporate legal arena.45 Environmental issues, including climate change,
are traditionally viewed as beyond the responsibility and remit of corporate law.
Transnational carbon-major corporations have been largely unregulated in terms of
their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,46 and corporate law has been an underused
tool to incentivize emissions reduction.47 Most carbon-major corporations
43

Id. at 179.
Id. at 181.
45
Shareholder primacy and contractarian theories have consistently argued that
externalities are more appropriately catered for by welfare laws and environmental or other
regulations outside of the realm of corporate law. They argue that corporate law should focus
solely on shareholders and shareholder wealth maximization. See Friedman, supra note 32;
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1446–48 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales
for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
STETSON L. REV. 23, 26–39 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate
Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 401, 401–07 (1993); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439,
440–43 (2000) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law];
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L. J. 387, 390 (2000); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate
Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 13 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 591 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; Stephen M.
Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor
Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1430–31 (1993) [hereinafter Bainbridge, In Defense];
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1480 (1989); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24
IND. L. REV. 223, 223–27 (1991). See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders
Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784–86 (2006); Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and
the Function of Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 141, 144–47 (2005).
46
Lisa Benjamin, The Responsibilities of Carbon Major Companies: Are They (and Is
the Law) Doing Enough?, 5 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 353, 353–54 (2016).
47
Id. at 375–76; Lisa Benjamin, The Duty of Due Consideration in the Anthropocene:
Climate Risk and English Directorial Duties, 11 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 90, 93–96
44
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traditionally approach emissions reductions as a voluntary and largely ethical
initiative, and part of broader corporate social responsibility aims.48 Climate change
is a particularly intractable problem for these types of corporations as efforts to
reduce or internalize the costs of GHG emissions undermines their business
models.49 GHG emissions are treated as a negative externality by corporate law, a
cost to be pushed outside of the corporation and absorbed by society.50 Climate
change is the “mother of all externalities”51 or “perhaps the greatest negative metaexternality ever imposed by economic systems on the natural world,”52 and one that
corporate law has traditionally been unwilling to address. Corporate law has
encouraged the outsourcing of negative externalities beyond the responsibility of the
corporation, as this approach is more profitable.53 Carbon-majors are a major source
of GHG emissions, but they have not yet been held legally responsible for their
contributions to climate change.
B. Why Carbon-Majors?
Carbon-majors have become the focus of a new wave of climate litigation.
There are several reasons why they have attracted renewed legal attention. Only a
small number of carbon-major corporations contribute a large amount of GHG
emissions.54 The concentration of these entities into large, transnational groups,
combined with their long history in the industry, make them accountable entities in
terms of the quantity of their historical emissions. They have continued to operate
around the globe largely unregulated in terms of their GHG emissions.55 Lack of

(2017); SARAH BARKER ET AL., DIRECTORS’ PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE
INACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 21 (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/569da64
79cadb6436a8fecc8/t/56e211bb27d4bd91a217cd88/1457656252528/Directors_liability_in
action_February_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XEU-G2EB]; Beate Sjafjell, Why Law
Matters: Corporate Social Irresponsibility and the Futility of Voluntary Climate Mitigation,
8 EUR. COMPANY L. 56, 61–64 (2011).
48
Benjamin, supra note 46, at 368–70.
49
Id. at 357–58; Sjafjell, supra note 47, 56–58; Jim Krane, Climate Change and Fossil
Fuel: An Examination of Risks for the Energy Industry and Producer States, 4 MRS ENERGY
& SUSTAINABILITY: REV. J. 1, 5–8 (2017).
50
An externality is a cost or benefit which is externalized outside of the corporation. A
negative externality is a cost.
51
Richard S. J. Tol, The Economic Effects of Climate Change, 23 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 29, 29 (2009).
52
Rosetta Lombardo & Giovanni D’Orio, Corporate and State Social Responsibility:
A Long-Term Perspective, 3 MOD. ECON. 91, 92 (2012).
53
Benjamin, supra note 46, at 354–58.
54
Heede, supra note 22, at 234.
55
Peter C. Frumhoff et al., The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon
Producers, 132 CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 158–62 (2015).

2020]

ROAD TO PARIS RUNS THROUGH DELAWARE

325

regulatory oversight may be another reason for the recent emergence of litigation
against these entities.56
New scientific processes have clearly identified the monumental contributions
corporate emissions have made to climate change and related negative impacts.57
These new scientific processes can identify the specific contributions corporations
have made to climate change, making them a clearer target for litigation as well as,
independent of litigation, regulatory attention. New scientific studies challenge the
prevailing assumption that corporate law should not consider and address the
contributions of corporations to climate change.58 The studies demonstrate that
corporate actors are the primary cause of historical emissions and clearly articulate
their factual responsibility. These corporations also have high levels of scientific and
technical expertise, and thus were in a position to understand and act on available
climate data. Rather than acting on this new data, however, many of the corporations
in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom sought to discredit
and disparage scientific evidence and lobbied to prevent policies that encouraged a
transition away from fossil fuels.59
In addition, and combined with increased litigation and regulatory risks, the
impacts of climate change are mounting, and directors, as well as investors such as
institutional investors and financiers, are now encouraged to view climate risk in a
bidirectional manner – considering both the contributions of corporations to climate
impacts but also the significant impacts and risks climate change poses to their
businesses. These risks are particularly acute for carbon-major corporations, and
investors are becoming concerned. Carbon-majors’ deceptive approach to climate
change, combined with their substantial presence in the value chain and high
exposure to climate risk, makes them “prime litigation targets.”60 New scientific

56

Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695, 717–
18 (2016).
57
See infra Section II.B.
58
Heede, supra note 22, at 229–30.
59
Frumhoff et al., supra note 55, at 159–63. The Union of Concerned Scientists also
enumerate the decades-long campaign described in internal corporate documents carried out
by a handful of carbon-major corporations such as Chevron, BP, Shell, Conoco Philips,
ExxonMobil and Peabody Energy to deceive the American public by distorting the realities
and risks of climate change, block policies designed to hasten the transition to clean energy,
and carry out a coordinated campaign to spread climate misinformation in order to maintain
their profitability. See generally KATHY MULVEY & SETH SHULMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, THE CLIMATE DECEPTION DOSSIERS: INTERNAL FOSSIL FUEL MEMOS
REVEALED DECADES OF CORPORATE DISINFORMATION (2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites
/default/files/attach/2015/07/The-Climate-Deception-Dossiers.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYH3HB2L] (providing a summary of seven “deception dossiers” of internal company and trade
association documents that have been leaked to the public as part of a coordinated campaign
to allegedly spread climate misinformation and block climate action).
60
Sonja van Renssen, Courts Take on Climate Change, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
655, 656 (2016).
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studies, combined with the increasing risk of climate change to society and
corporations, have helped to make carbon-majors the focus of climate litigation.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CLIMATE LITIGATION
The first wave of climate litigation against carbon-major corporations faced a
number of hurdles.61 These included problems in proving causation under tort law,
how to identify an appropriate class of defendants and issues of standing,62 the
61
This first wave of litigation focuses on a select group of cases where carbon-major
corporations stood as defendants, but it should be noted that there have been a number of
pro- and anti- regulation suits in the United States as well. For example, in Massachusetts v.
Envtl. Prot. Agency (EPA), 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly accepted
climate science and ushered in a regulatory mandate for the EPA to regulate GHG emissions
under the Clean Air Act. See Melissa Powers, Country Report: USA Climate Change in the
Supreme Court, 2012 IUCN ACADEMY ENVTL. L.J. 245, 246 (2012) (noting that the outcome
of American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), could have been
influenced by the changing regulatory context of climate change under the Obama
Administration).
62
While this Article does not deal with issues of standing in depth, standing issues did
occur in the first wave of litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Article III of
the U.S. Constitution as requiring that, in order to have standing to bring a case in federal
court, the plaintiff must establish: (i) the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact; (ii) that injury
is fairly traceable to the defendant’s misconduct; and (iii) the injury is capable of being
redressed by the court. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007); Lujan v. Def. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). The Murphy Oil case is a notable example of both
issues of standing and causality in the context of suits against carbon major corporations,
though the case is ultimately unhelpful due to a number of procedural oddities that took
place. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs in Murphy
Oil sued a number of corporations, including insurance corporations, carbon major
corporations, and banks, for damages wrought by Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiffs targeted
carbon major corporations due to their contributions to climate change, which the plaintiffs
claimed led to the unprecedented strength of the storm. The plaintiffs pointed to the
knowledge of carbon major corporations about climate change and their lack of action to use
technology or their profits to combat it. Id. at 864–65. While the district court dismissed the
case for various reasons, including lack of standing, an appellate panel in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to bring claims of
public and private nuisance, trespass and negligence, which all depended on a causal link
between emissions and destruction of their property. Id. at 879–80. The Fifth Circuit panel
relied on Massachusetts v. EPA, which acknowledged a plausible link between man-made
emissions and global warning. Id. at 865–866 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007)). On top of this standing conclusion, the panel’s causation analysis is also notable in
that the court accepted, at the pleadings stage at least, a fairly traceable connection between
the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant for standing purposes.
Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d at 879–80. According to the panel, traceability in this context did not
require the demonstration of scientific certainty that the corporations’ emissions caused the
precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Instead, the court recognized that injuries could be
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political question doctrine,63 as well as the difficulty in linking harm to a particular
person or entity caused by specific emissions from one state or one company.64
Causation requires that plaintiffs demonstrate a causal connection between the harm
suffered and the actions of the defendant. Causation remains factually difficult, if
not impossible, to prove due to the disparate nature of GHG emissions, and so
remains a challenge for litigation against corporations, even in the second wave of
litigation. Emissions of GHGs from different sources mix in the atmosphere and
have impacts all over the globe. As a result, this process of mixing makes attributing
a particular harm to a particular emitter difficult, if not impossible. This creates
significant hurdles for plaintiffs in tort-based actions, although new scientific
processes are closing the causation gap. This section will focus on judicial reluctance
to take on the complexity of climate science, and judicial preference to defer the
issue to legislative bodies based on, among other issues, federal displacement
arguments in the first wave of climate litigation. These difficulties have, in the past,
created insurmountable barriers for tort-based litigation suits against corporations.
This section will demonstrate how litigants are attempting to dismantle these two
hurdles in the second wave of climate litigation.
A. Hurdles in the First Wave of Climate Litigation
The first wave of cases against carbon-majors failed primarily due to the federal
displacement doctrine – that federal legislation such as the Clean Air Act displaces
federal common law. A number of courts in the United States preferred to defer the
issue, instead, to legislative bodies. Judges were also reluctant and/or poorly
equipped to deal with the complexities of climate science.
Two major cases in the first wave of litigation were American Electric Power
Co. v. Connecticut (AEP)65 and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.
(Kivalina).66 These cases illustrate judicial inadequacies when dealing with climate
fairly traceable to actions that contributed to, rather than solely or materially caused,
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. Id. at 864–66.
These initial wins for the Murphy Oil plaintiffs were short-lived, however. The panel’s
decision in Murphy Oil was vacated when the Fifth Circuit agreed to an en banc review.
Although the court agreed to hear the en banc panel, it was unable to form a quorum and
thus dismissed the case, and the panel’s decision remained vacated. Comer v. Murphy Oil,
607 F.3d 1049, 1053–55 (5th Cir. 2010).
63
The political question doctrine states that courts will only adjudicate matters of law
and will refrain from adjudicating matters which are determined to be political questions
which are best left to the legislature, as stipulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). See, e.g., City of Oakland v. B.P., 325 F. Supp. 3d
1017, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal pending, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020).
64
See Preston, (Part 1), supra note 38, at 7; Josephine van Zeben, Establishing a
Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?,
4 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 339, 348 (2015).
65
564 U.S. 410.
66
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
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science, as well as a judicial reluctant to adjudicate such a systemic issue as climate
change. Some of these hurdles are being challenged in the second wave of climate
litigation.
AEP was a public nuisance suit brought by eight states and New York City
against six electric and utility corporations. The plaintiffs argued that the emissions
of these corporations interfered with public rights and asked the court to impose
declining emission caps on these entities in order to reduce emissions.67 The
Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding that the Clean Air Act “displaced” any
federal nuisance action dealing with climate change.68 Justice Ginsburg, writing for
a unanimous Court, wrote that there was no “parallel track” for federal nuisance
claims on climate change.69 This definitive statement by the Supreme Court
effectively closed the door to future federal nuisance common law claims on climate
change,70 even though the EPA had not taken comprehensive action on climate
change at the time.71
AEP also illustrates the judicial reluctance, or “skittishness,”72 of the courts in
dealing with climate change disputes and climate science. Burkett notes the
regressive approach of the Court in acknowledging climate science, as the Court in
AEP cited a skeptical magazine article in the same context as multiple peer-reviewed
articles, going on to make a “facile indictment”73 of all living, breathing individuals
as contributing to climate change. The reluctance of the judiciary to appropriately
cater for climate science, in this case, stands in contrast to newer judicial attitudes
to climate science illustrated in the second wave of climate litigation. The AEP case
67

Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 418–19.
Id. at 423; see also James Flynn, Climate of Confusion: Climate Change Litigation
in the Wake of American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 823, 846
(2013); Fredric Eisenstate, American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut: How One
Less Legal Theory Available in the Effort to Curb Emissions Is Actually One Step Forward
for the Cause, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 222 (2012); Phillip Divisek, Climate Change Torts:
American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 7 MACQUARIE J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 108,
108 (2011).
69
Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425.
70
Flynn, supra note 68, at 856; Divisek, supra note 68, at 109.
71
The Court in AEP held that plaintiffs’ nuisance claims were displaced by the Clean
Air Act regardless of whether the “EPA actually exercises its regulatory authority,” and
“[t]he critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision whether and how to
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions . . . the delegation is what displaces federal common law.”
Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425–26. But see Flynn, supra note 68, at 847–48 (arguing
that the Clean Air Act only addresses domestic air resources whereas the impacts of climate
change are more complex, exceeding impacts on air, and are also transboundary). This may
point to a general reluctance by the judiciary to tackle what they considered to be a political
issue.
72
Maxine Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE
115, 118 (2011).
73
Id. This approach lies in stark contrast to Massachusetts v. EPA, where the Supreme
Court easily accepted climate science. 549 U.S. at 521–22.
68
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also revealed the concerns of the judiciary over acting as arbiters of scientific
debates.74 The enormity of the issue of climate change and its implications for
industrial development may also have been decisive factors for courts in the first
wave of climate litigation. Courts have been reluctant to make definitive findings of
fact about climate change and are sensitive to climate change policy being the
purview of legislative bodies.75
In Kivalina, the Alaskan Native Village of Kivalina brought a suit for public
nuisance against twenty-two fossil-fuel producers.76 The Village claimed that these
corporations contributed to climate change, which led to the dramatic reduction of
the Arctic sea ice that had previously sheltered their homes from winter storms.77 In
September 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of their
claim, concluding that common law tort claims had been “displaced” by federal
legislation.78 The decision did not address the district court’s refusal to determine
what acceptable levels of emissions by the corporate defendants should be and who
should bear the costs of those emissions.79 The Kivalina decision suggests that AEP
will continue to apply to all federal U.S. climate change tort claims, regardless of
the specified remedy.80 Powers notes that AEP effectively foreclosed the use of
federal tort law to mitigate climate change.81 Both AEP and Kivalina laid bare the
74

Osofsky & Peel, supra note 56, at 766.
For example, the Court in AEP asserted that courts “lack the scientific, economic,
and technological resources [of] an agency . . . ” to regulate climate change. Am. Elec. Power
Co. 564 U.S. at 428. As another example, in People v. General Motors Corp., California lost
its suit against major automobile manufacturers for impacts from climate change partly due
to the court determining it was not able to impose damages without unreasonably
encroaching onto global issues. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007); see Ganguly et. al., supra note 21, at 12; Weaver & Kysar supra note 38, at
325 (stating that courts were overwhelmed by the sheer complexity and size of the climate
change problem); James Huffman, Previously Unrecognized Rights: Climate Change
Lawsuits and the Rule of Law, QUILLETTE (Oct. 30, 2018), https://quillette.com/2018/10/30/
previously-unrecognized-rights-climate-change-lawsuits-and-the-rule-of-law/ [https://perm
a.cc/8A69-GCN2].
76
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
77
Id. at 855; see Flynn, supra note 68, at 836; Peter Manus, Kivalina at the Supreme
Court: A Lost Opportunity for Federal Common Law, 8 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L.
223, 225 (2014).
78
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858. In May 2013, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’
petition for certiorari without comment, leaving the Ninth Circuit decision intact. Native Vill.
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1000
(2013); see Karine Péloffy, Kivalina v. ExxonMobil: A Comparative Case Commentary, 9
MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. POL’Y 119, 122 (2013).
79
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 854 (affirming the district court’s holding that these “were
matters more appropriately left for determination by the executive or legislative branch”).
80
Quin M. Sorenson, Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corporation: The End
of “Climate Change” Tort Litigation?, 44 ABA TRENDS 1, 6 (2013).
81
Powers, supra note 61, at 245.
75
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judicial preference in U.S. courts to ensure that climate change is decided by the
legislature.82 This judicial preference persists in the second wave of climate
litigation and, as a result of these cases, federal common law nuisance claims on
climate change against corporations still face tremendous hurdles. Litigants in the
second wave of climate litigation have attempted to dismantle these hurdles, with
varying levels of success. Litigants have started to draft their claims in order to avoid
the federal displacement doctrine.83 They have also been assisted by new scientific
82

Flynn, supra note 68, at 837.
For example, a class action suit was launched by young people in the U.S. District
Court for the District Court of Oregon, claiming that the actions of the federal government
that caused climate change, as well as the government’s inaction to prevent it, had violated
the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Due Process rights by denying protection provided to
previous generations, by favoring economic short-term interests and denying future
generations of essential natural resources, including a safe climate. Juliana v. United States,
217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233–34 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.
Jan. 17, 2020). At the time of writing, the case was proceeding to a request for a Ninth Circuit
en banc review. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Juliana, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. Jan. 17,
2020) (No.18-36082). However, industry intervenors had already withdrawn, partly due,
according to Blumm and Wood, to concerns about having to respond to disclosure requests.
Despite their withdrawal being granted, Blumm and Wood argue that exposure of the
relationship between government and the fossil fuel industry will prove to be one of the more
devastating outcomes of the case. Blumm & Wood, supra note 38, at 28, 55 (citing Order at
5, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC)). Blumm and Wood also note
Juliana’s use of the public trust doctrine (PTD), which would be exempted from the federal
displacement doctrine, which only applies to federal common law claims, whereas the
District Court recognized the PTD as an “inherent limit on sovereignty and implicit in the
Constitution’s due process clause.” Id. at 51–52 (citing Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261). If
successful, the regulatory implications of this case would be vast and, as a result, it has been
called the “trial of the century.” See Peter Singer, The Trial of the Century, Fighting for a
Healthier Planet, THE DAILY STAR (Sept. 15, 2018, 12:09 AM), https://www.dailystar.com.
lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=463429&mode=print
[https://perma.cc/DFG3-QSH8].
The
procedural elements of the case are extremely complex. As part of these proceedings, Chief
Justice Roberts granted a temporary halt in response to a request by the federal government
to stay the case. In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 16, vacated, 139 S. Ct. 452 (2018); see also
Michael Blumm & Mary Wood, These Kids and Young Adults Want Their Day in Court on
Climate Change, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 26, 2018, 6:44 AM), http://theconversation.com/
these-kids-and-young-adults-want-their-day-in-court-on-climate-change-105277 [https://pe
rma.cc/8VV3-6PZP]. However, the stay was subsequently lifted. In re United States, 139 S.
Ct. 452, 453 (2018). An oral hearing was held in front of the Ninth Circuit on June 4, 2019.
See Oliver A. Houck, The Children’s Climate Case: Our Obligation to Future Generations,
THE HILL (Nov. 6, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/415307-thechildrens-climate-case-our-obligation-to-future-generations
[https://perma.cc/YR9D8RCS]. In January 2020, the Ninth Circuit ruled 2-1 to dismiss the lawsuit. Juliana, 947 F.3d
at 1175. While the court accepted climate science and that urgent action was needed, it
dismissed the suit on the basis of lack of standing based on the inability of the court to provide
redress. Id. Judge Josephine Staton’s dissent in the case, however, is notable. See Juliana,
947 F.3d at 1175–91 (Staton, J. dissenting). Class action suits by young people were also
83

2020]

ROAD TO PARIS RUNS THROUGH DELAWARE

331

processes and developments which have clearly attributed the majority of historical
GHG emissions to carbon-major corporations, and judges have started to engage
more confidently with this new climate science.
B. New Scientific Processes
Recent developments in scientific processes have identified the contributions
of carbon-majors to climate change and provided an impetus to renewed climate
litigation efforts. In 2013, Richard Heede published a groundbreaking quantitative
analysis of historic fossil fuel and cement production records of 90 leading investorowned, state-owned, and nation-state producers of oil, natural gas, coal, and cement.
His study concluded that these 90 carbon-major entities were responsible for 63%
of cumulative worldwide industrial emissions of carbon dioxide and methane from
1854–2010.84 Investor-owned entities contributed the majority of these emissions,
315 gigatonnes, followed closely by nation-states, and state-owned fossil fuel and
cement-producing entities.85 The twenty largest investor- and state-owned energy
corporations were responsible for 29.5% of all global industrial emissions, and the
ten largest investor-owned corporations alone were responsible for 15.8% of global
industrial emissions through 2010.86
Heede’s analysis has been revolutionary in terms of its ability to attribute a
percentage of global emissions to these entities. Heede’s work has been a motivating
factor in the second wave of litigation around the world against these entities, and it
has been referred to in almost every new suit launched against carbon-major
corporations.87 Heede’s research demonstrates the gap between scientific attribution
and legal assignment of responsibility. The law has so far fallen behind scientific
progress in the context of corporate climate emissions and, therefore, corporate
accountability. Whether or not Heede’s factual accountability can be translated into
legal accountability is unclear, particularly within tort law.
Heede’s carbon-major study has been further developed by probabilistic event
attribution science, often called attribution science.88 This discipline is developing

launched in 2018 in: Canada, Environnement Jeunesse v. Procureur Général du Canada,
[2018] No. 500-06; Florida, First Amended Complaint, Reynolds v. Florida, No. 18-CA000819 (Dec. 26, 2018); Washington, Aji P. v. Washington, No. 18-2-04448-1-SEA (Wash.
Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2018); and Alaska in 2017, Sinnok v. Alaska, No. 3AN-17-09910
(Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2018).
84
Heede, supra note 22, at 234.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See, e.g., Hasemyer, supra note 7.
88
See GABRIELE C. HEGERL ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE [IPCC], GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE PAPER ON DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION
RELATED TO ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE CHANGE 2–7 (Thomas Stocker et al. eds., 2009),
http://www.ipcc-wg2.awi.de/guidancepaper/IPCC_D%26A_GoodPracticeGuidancePaper.
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quickly and is able to attribute the multiplying contribution of climate change to
particular extreme events, although attribution science is more confident in certain
areas than others.89 Event attribution relies on observational records to determine
changes in probability or magnitude of climate-related events and uses model
simulations to compare the manifestation of an event in a world with human-caused
climate change and a world without.90 It does this by constructing factual and
counterfactual probabilities or worlds. A factual probability is one where an event
occurs in the currently observed world as it exists in the context of climate change,
and a counterfactual probability occurs in a hypothetical “control” world without
human influence on the climate.91 By comparing the real-world events to the
hypothetical ones, climate scientists can predict which events were caused, at least
in part, by climate change.
This new process of attribution science has been applied to corporate actors as
well and has the potential to impact legal tests such as causation. Therefore,
attribution science is likely to inspire future litigation efforts against these actors.
Fossil fuel corporations are becoming an increasing focal point of attribution efforts,
pdf [https://perma.cc/DMS3-XGB7] (reviewing the effect climate change is having on the
earth via attribution theory and providing for methodology, different approaches, and data
usage of the attribution based analysis); see also NATHANIEL L. BINDOFF ET AL.,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION
OF CLIMATE CHANGE FROM GLOBAL TO REGIONAL (Judit Bartholy et al. eds., 2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_Chapter10_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G5PU-PC5E] (discussing the detection and attribution evaluation methodologies
and the effect attribution has on climate change). The National Academies Press recently
published a report on the state of attribution science, stating that scientific understanding of
climate and weather mechanisms is improving, and as a result rapid progress is being made
in event attribution. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., ATTRIBUTION OF EXTREME
WEATHER EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 6–7 (National Academies Press
2016).
89
Confidence in attribution studies is strongest where there exist long historical records
of observations which can be simulated adequately by climate models. These tend to be
purely meteorological events which are not strongly influenced by issues such as
infrastructure and population trends, or in circumstances where other factors can be carefully
and reliably considered. The findings are strongest for extreme events related to aspects of
temperature, such as extreme heat or cold events and heavy rainfall, and tend to be less robust
for tropical cyclones, wildfires and drought. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. ENG’G, & MED., supra
note 88, at 1–13.
90
Id. at 2–3.
91
Id. at x (noting the first attribution study was published in 2004 regarding the
European heatwave in 2003, and estimated that the summer was 0.5°C warmer); see also
Peter A. Stott et al., Human Contribution to the European Heatwave of 2003, 432 NATURE
610, 610–14 (2004). Event attribution science has progressed tremendously since that date,
with Daniel Mitchell et al.’s study being able to now attribute a certain number of deaths
during the heatwave to human induced climate change. See Daniel Mitchell et al., Attributing
Human Mortality During Extreme Heat Waves to Anthropogenic Climate Change, 11
ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS 1 (2016).
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building on the initial work by Heede, in relation to specific temperature increases
and sea-levels. Heede’s work has been expanded by Ekwurzel et al., who recently
published a paper tracing the contributions of emissions by several carbon-major
corporations to the rise in global mean surface temperatures. Their paper determined
that the combustion of products from 90 carbon-major entities from 1880–2010 led
to 0.4°C increase in global mean surface temperatures, constituting 50% of the total
global increase during this time period.92 Combustion from 1980–2010 led to a
0.28°C rise, constituting 35.1% of total global mean surface temperature increase
during that period.93 Their models are scalable and allow for the testing of the
relative contributions of these entities, even at individual levels for the largest
emitters (Chevron, ExxonMobil, Saudi Aramco, and Gazprom).94 They are also able
to trace increments of sea-level rise to the combustion of fossil fuel products from
these entities, which has direct relevance to the recent cases launched in the second
wave of climate litigation where government entities are claiming abatement costs
for sea-level rise.95
These new studies make great headway in closing the causation gap highlighted
in the first wave of climate litigation. Developments in attribution science have the
potential to “change the legal landscape,”96 leading to implications for directors with
legal duties to consider and avoid foreseeable harm. Improvements in attribution
science are proving foreseeability, which is key to establishing a tort-based duty of
care. 97 These studies make the connection between corporate emissions and their
harm very clear. Evidence from attribution science will catalyze future climate
change litigation, and may inform common law-based litigation of directors’ and
officers’ liability.98 Indeed, despite the lack of federal legislative progress on climate
change in the United States, a second wave of climate litigation against carbon-major
companies has already begun in earnest, as the next Section discusses. While cases
92

B. Ekwurzel et al., The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2 Surface Temperature, and
Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 579,
585 (2017).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 582, 586–88 (noting three sources of uncertainty: equilibrium climate
sensitivity; the short-term effects of fossil fuel aerosols; and the policy relevance of different
time periods of historical emissions).
95
Id. at 586–88 (clarifying that their work is not designed to assign responsibility, an
issue which they reserve for societal judgment). They do acknowledge that the tools of
attribution science are being applied to characterize specific damages resulting from specific
players in anthropogenic climate change, and therefore societal judgments should be
informed by the ongoing scientific analysis.
96
Marjanac et al., supra note 25, at 616.
97
Id.
98
Id. (noting that probabilistic evidence is already accepted in U.K. occupational
exposure to toxic substances cases where causation has been proved when the evidence
demonstrates a ‘doubling-of-the-risk’ test, that the risk was increased by a factor of 2:1); see
e.g., XYZ v. Schering [2002] EWHC 1420 (UK); Sienkiewicz v. Greif [2011] UKSC 10
(UK).
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in the first wave were unsuccessful, cases in the second wave are using multiple
legal tools and attempting to scale the hurdles encountered in the first wave of
litigation. In addition, judges in these cases are demonstrating more willingness to
acknowledge and manage climate science.
C. The Second Wave of Climate Litigation: Hurdling the Hurdles
A number of new suits were launched primarily by government actors in 2017
and 2018 in the United States and around the world. In this second wave, climate
litigation is taking a variety of forms, including using tort law, public and private
nuisance, human rights, and the public trust doctrine.99 Newer cases against
corporations have also employed fiduciary duty and security law disclosure
requirements or statutory offenses,100 highlighting a turn to corporate law in the
second wave of litigation. Litigants in the second wave are also attempting to
overcome the federal displacement hurdle by citing state-based claims and breaches
of other state legislation.101
Tort-based claims are evolving, and attribution science may be influencing both
their initiation and outcomes.102 For example, in 2017, a case in Germany, RWE v
Lliuya, found the possibility of a causal and proximate relationship between the
emissions of a German energy company, RWE, and climate damage experienced in
Peru.103 The plaintiff cited Heede’s calculations that RWE was responsible for
99

Preston, (Part 1), supra note 38, at 4; Preston, (Part 2), supra note 38, at 258; Blumm
&Wood, supra note 38, at 73–83.
100
For example, New York’s Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–353 (McKinney
2019) has been relied up on by the Attorney General of New York to investigate and sue
ExxonMobil. See Decision and Order at 2, People of the State of New York v. ExxonMobil
Corporation, No. 451962 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2016). The Martin Act is a New York antifraud law which provides the Attorney General with expansive powers of investigation into
securities fraud. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352–353. In December 2019 the court ruled
against New York on its Martin Act claim against Exxon. See John Schwartz, New York
Loses Climate Change Fraud Case Against Exxon Mobil, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/2sdIAYF [https://perma.cc/8BWX-YJFC].
101
See supra notes 9–17.
102
Weaver & Kysar, supra note 38, at 339 (arguing that courts should be re-examining
the parameters of tort law considering the catastrophic impacts of climate change).
103
See Lliuya v. RWE AG, CLIMATE CASES CHART, http://climatecasechart.com/nonus-case/lliuya-v-rwe-ag/ [https://perma.cc/W8TF-7DHZ] (last visited Oct. 8, 2019); see also
Stefan Küper, Higher Regional Court Hamm: Large Emitters Can Be Held Liable for
Climate Change Impacts, GERMANWATCH, (Nov. 13, 2017), https://germanwatch.org/en/14
702 [https://perma.cc/V5YE-29FM]. Mr. Lliuya’s house sits downhill of a glacial lake, Lake
Palcococha. Mr. Lliuya alleged that the volume of the lake has increased from 10 m³ in the
1930s to 17.3 m³ in 2016, with glacial melt directly contributing to its increased volume. He
also alleged that his home is vulnerable to glacial outbursts—inundations of the natural
moraine dams surrounding the lake that would lead to flood waves, possibly reaching over 3
meters. See Landgericht [LG] [Essen District Court] Dec. 15, 2016, 2vOv285/15 (Ger.),
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0.47% of all historic emissions, and therefore asked for 0.47% of the total costs of
remediation actions taken in Peru.104 On appeal, the Appellate Hamm Court agreed
with the plaintiffs, provisionally accepting arguments that it was sufficient that RWE
was partially responsible for the flood risk.105 The case was able to overcome, at
least in principle, one of the most intractable legal hurdles to date in terms of tortbased actions against corporations: causation. The civil law jurisdiction of Germany
is far removed from common law jurisdictions, such as the United States, and the
case may remain an outlier for some time. Despite this, the outcome of the RWE
case demonstrates that some jurisdictions are willing to base their decisions on new
scientific processes and illustrates how the evolution of climate science could affect
future U.S. lawsuits.
D. Managing Climate Science
In 2017 and 2018, government entities launched suits against a number of
carbon-major corporations. While most of these cases are still at their procedural or
initial substantive stages, issues of causation and federal versus state jurisdiction
have already been implicated. This second wave of cases can be divided into two

translation in CLIMATE CASES CHART, http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-changelitigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2016/20161215_Case-No.2-O-28515-Essen-Regional-Court_decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9JV-9PY4] (last visited
Mar. 30, 2020) [hereinafter Lliuya v. RWE AG, Essen District Court Decision, English
Translation]. He based his claim on paragraph 1004 of the Germany Civil Code, which deals
with interference with property. See id.
104
See Lliuya v. RWE AG, Essen District Court Decision, English Translation, supra
note 103. Mr. Lliuya alleged that his abatement costs requested amounted to approximately
€17,000 (approximately USD$19,000). Id. The first decision in the District Court of Essen
dismissed the claim for the usual tort-based causation hurdles. The District Court stated that
the lack of precision made the claim inadmissible, and RWE’s contribution to climate change
was not sufficient to establish legal causality, citing the lack of linear causality between a
particular source and particularized damage. Id. Similar to AEP, Am. Elec. Power Co. v.
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), the court also mentioned that every living person is an
emitter, and referred to the chain of causation as “scientifically disputed.” Id.
105
Lliuya v. RWE AG, CLIMATE CASE CHART, supra note 103. The case will now move
on to the evidentiary phase, and the court has requested expert evidence in two areas: that
the flood/mudslide resulting from expansion of water posed serious threats to Mr. Lliuya’s
property, and whether RWE’s emissions rose into the atmosphere and according to the laws
of physics led to higher concentrations of GHGs in the Earth’s atmosphere. Id.
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groups, the first brought by the cities of New York,106 Oakland, and San Francisco,107
which have made a more limited set of claims and where initial substantive decisions
have already been made. The second group of claims has been brought by a number
of cities and counties in California, as well as other government entities around the
United States,108 based on a broader set of claims but where no substantive decisions
have yet been made.
In the first group of cases, New York City claimed, in federal court, that the
City had incurred, and would continue to incur, substantial costs due to climate
change, and that the largest five fossil fuel companies should be responsible for these
costs as they were responsible for approximately 11% of carbon and methane
pollution and had downplayed the risks of climate change.109 New York’s claim was
sited upon both public and private nuisance law, as well as illegal trespass due to
sea-level rise. In July 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant companies on the basis that
federal common law governed the City’s claims, as they were based on transnational
emissions, and their claims were displaced by the Clean Air Act and presented
nonjusticiable political questions.110 The case demonstrates how difficult a hurdle
the federal displacement issue is to overcome.
In the Oakland and San Francisco cases, the plaintiffs filed suit in state court
against the same five carbon-major corporations, seeking abatement, not damages,
for the costs to them of adapting to sea-level rise induced by climate change on the
basis of public nuisance.111 One of the more interesting aspects of the case was that,
after the cases were consolidated and removed by the defendants to federal court,
the judge ordered a tutorial on climate change that took place in March 2018. Judge
Alsup requested specific information on the history of the scientific study on climate
change, as well as on the best science now available on global warming, glacial melt,
106

See generally City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(detailing litigation action from the City of New York against the collective defendants for
the general affects they have had on the environment), appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.
argued Nov. 22, 2019).
107
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(dismissing Oaklands and San Francisco’s public nuisance action), appeal pending, No. 1816663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020).
108
Complaint at 75–94, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., C17-01227 (Cal.
Super. Ct. July 17, 2017), Doc. 1; Complaint at 95–118, City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp.,
18-cv-0458 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2017), Doc 1; Complaint at 90–111, City of Richmond
v. Chevron Corp., C 18-00055 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2018), Doc. 1; Complaint at 78–97,
Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 17-CIV-03222 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 2017) Doc. 1;
Complaint at 79–98, Cty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp., CIV-17-02586 (Cal. Super. Ct. July
17, 2017), Doc 1; see also infra Section II.C.
109
City of New York v. BP, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 471.
110
Id. at 471–72. An appeal is currently pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and oral arguments were held in November 2019. City of New York v. BP
P.L.C., No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. argued Nov. 22, 2019).
111
City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1021, 1024.
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sea rise, and coastal flooding.112 The request for a scientific tutorial in a federal
lawsuit was called “unprecedented.”113 This innovative approach to climate science
may usher in a new approach in U.S. cases of judicial assessment and
acknowledgment of climate science, including attribution science. The case
demonstrated a more sophisticated judicial approach to climate science than was
demonstrated in the first wave of climate litigation.
Judge Alsup’s understanding of climate science is reflected in the judgment,
which clearly stated that the case was not about climate science but about the law,
“whether these producers of fossil fuels should pay for anticipated harm that will
eventually flow from a rise in sea level.”114 Ultimately, his answer was no, and the
court dismissed the claim in June 2018, based on a number of grounds, including the
federal displacement doctrine, and that the issue was largely a political one.115 The
court also applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of public nuisance:
an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.116 Whether
the interference was unreasonable under the Restatement’s test depended in part on
weighing the harm of the conduct against the utility of the conduct. Judge Alsup
found that it was necessary to consider the social value of fossil fuels, which
outweighed the harm of the conduct.117 The Oakland judgment illustrates that, in
this second wave of climate litigation against corporations, judges are able and
willing to assess complex climate science. But the case also illustrates that both the
federal displacement doctrine, combined with judicial reluctance to adjudicate
corporate climate harms, is alive and well in U.S. jurisprudence against carbonmajor corporations and will remain a stumbling block in federal common law
claims.118
In both the New York City and the Oakland and San Francisco cases, the courts
rejected the plaintiffs’ attempts to invoke state common law to avoid the federal
displacement doctrine. In City of New York, the court noted that the “City has not
112

Id.; see also California v. BP P.L.C., No. C-17-06011 WHA and No. C-17-06012
WHA (Feb. 27, 2018) (Notice Re Tutorial). Both Chevron’s lead attorney and Myles Allen
for the plaintiff (and co-author of the original attribution study in 2004), presented to the
judge. Chevron’s attorney stated that the company acknowledged that humans are playing a
major role in climate change, but instead his presentation focused on the scientific
uncertainty in the IPCC AR5 reports, particularly around sea-level rise. The roles of
population growth and economic development were also stressed. See Warren Cornwall, In
a San Francisco Courtroom, Climate Science Gets Its Day on the Docket, SCI. MAG. (Mar.
22, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/03/san-francisco-court-roomclimate-science-gets-its-day-docket [https://perma.cc/9ZL7-473U].
113
Cornwall, supra note 112.
114
City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.
115
Id. at 1024.
116
Id. at 1024 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (AM. LAW INST.,
1979)).
117
Id. at 1023.
118
The case has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No.
18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020).
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sued under New York law,” and its claims were properly analyzed as federal
common law claims and were therefore displaced by the Clean Air Act.119 In
contrast, the plaintiffs in Oakland expressly brought their original claims under
California public nuisance law and in state court, but the defendants nevertheless
successfully removed the case to federal court and convinced the federal judge that
federal common law governed the claims.120 In denying the plaintiffs’ motion to
remand the case to the state level,121 Judge Alsup commented that if ever a problem
“cried out for a uniform and comprehensive solution” at the federal level, it is
climate change.122 The lack of success in the attempts by Oakland, San Francisco,
and New York to invoke state law was a fatal flaw for the initial substantive
decisions in this first group of cases and has been taken into account by litigants the
second group of cases. Most of the claims in the second group specifically ground
their actions in a wider set of claims, including state-based common law and
statutes.123
E. Avoiding Federal Displacement
The second group of cases brought by California cities and counties attempts
to avoid the federal displacement doctrine by making a more diverse set of claims
grounded in state law, including public and private nuisance, strict liability for
failure to warn customers of the dangers of climate change, design defect,
negligence, and trespass.124 These suits were patterned more closely on tobacco and
119
City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal
pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. argued Nov. 22, 2019).
120
City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1021.
121
Id.
122
Order Denying Motion to Remand at 4, ¶ 26, California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 1706011 WHA and No. C 17-06012 WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018).
123
See Complaint at 75–94, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. C17-01227
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 2017), Doc. 1; Complaint at 99–122, Cty. of Santa Cruz v. Chevron
Corp., No. 17-cv-03242 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2017), Doc. 1; First Amend. Complaint at
89–94, King Cty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-00758-RSL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2018), Doc.
113; Complaint at 115–139, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super.
Ct., Providence/Bristol Cty., July 2, 2018); Complaint at 107–129, Mayor of Baltimore v.
BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore City, July 20, 2018).
124
See supra note 123. New York City had also framed their claim as being based on
the sales and production of fossil fuels, rather than emissions, but the court rejected this. See
City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that
New York’s climate nuisance claims were displaced, reasoning that “regardless of the
manner in which the City frames its claims . . . the City is seeking damages for globalwarming related injuries resulting from greenhouse gas emissions, and not only the
production of Defendants’ fossil fuels”). The original complaint in Rhode Island v. Chevron
Corp. cites the percentage of total emissions that the defendants as a group are responsible
for from the years 1965 to 2015 and, while the plaintiffs acknowledge no linear causation is
possible, the claim states that attribution to each defendant of a quantifiable amount of carbon
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asbestos litigation.125 In both the tobacco and asbestos litigation, products that were
later understood to create severe health and environmental risks, and where product
manufacturers both knew and attempted to disguise the risks of their products,
attracted liability. In the tobacco litigation, tobacco company defendants adopted a
“scorched earth”126 litigation strategy, vigorously defending all of the suits against
them. Even though the original tobacco litigation suits were unsuccessful, the
litigation inspired legislative changes and eventually led to successful litigation.127
Analogies can also be drawn with litigation recently launched by cities, counties,
and states’ attorneys general against manufacturers and distributors of opioids.128 A
emissions is possible, therefore allowing attribution of ambient air and ocean temperatures,
as well as sea-level rise, in response to those emissions on an individual and aggregate basis.
See Complaint at 4, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct. July
2, 2018). This is the first time specific attribution science for specified temperature increases
and sea-level rise has been cited in a case against a carbon major entity in the United States.
However, unlike in City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., the judge in Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp.
has not requested a “climate tutorial.” Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142
(D. R.I. 2019) (Order Granting Motion to Remand).
125
See generally Olszynski et al., supra note 21 (tracking the similarities between
tobacco and climate litigation and noting that tobacco norms that evolved over time closely
tied to evolving scientific understandings of tobacco’s impacts on human health). Olszynski
et al. describe the “scorched earth” approach that tobacco companies initially adopted in
responding to personal injury litigation. The initial tobacco suits by plaintiffs all failed, in
part due to tobacco’s vigorous litigation strategies which denied the impact of smoking on
human health. However, as the link between smoking and lung cancer evolved, so did
corporate strategies, shifting to personal responsibility defenses. Olszynski et al. look a
decade into the future, characterized by mounting climate damages and in that context
highlight the similarities between tobacco litigation and climate litigation against carbon
major corporations. Id. at 10-21; see also Ganguly et al., supra note 21, at 17 (noting that
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006) demonstrated that
governments could recover health and environmental related costs). Similarities with
asbestos litigation can also be noted. Pursuant to Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Ltd. [2002]
UKHL 22, a leading U.K. torts case, a plaintiff who contracted asbestos while working for
different employers was able to recover from one defendant on the basis of joint and several
liability, because the defendant had materially increased the risk of harm, even though the
plaintiff was unable to pinpoint which employer had directly caused the harm. See also David
A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22–31 (2003); Michael Gerrard, What Litigation of a
Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 11, 12–14, 56
(2012).
126
Olszynski et al., supra note 21, at 10.
127
Gerrard, supra note 125, at 18; Olszynski supra note 21, at 12–14; Douglas Kysar,
Fossil Fuel Industry’s ‘Tobacco Moment’ Has Arrived, YALE L. SCH. (July 28 2017),
https://law.yale.edu/fossil-fuel-industrys-tobacco-moment-has-arrived [https://perma.cc/C4
A5-55DR].
128
Nicole Fisher, Opioid Lawsuits on Par to Become Largest Civil Litigation
Agreement
in
U.S.
History,
FORBES
(Oct.
18,
2018,
6:52
PM),
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key distinction between all of these other litigation efforts and climate litigation is
the widespread use and reliance on fossil fuels for global development, and this issue
was key to Judge Alsup’s decision in the Oakland and San Francisco dismissal.129
Despite these numerous hurdles, some Californian cities and counties have
been procedurally successful at having their claims heard at the state and not the
federal level. For example, Judge Chhabria in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California agreed to remand County of San Mateo v. Chevron
Corp., to the state level.130 In his order, Judge Chhabria noted that AEP did not
resolve the issue of whether state law claims were preempted by federal statutes
such as the Clean Air Act.131 In his view, once federal common law is displaced by
a federal statute, it is no longer possible that state law claims could be superseded
by federal common law. In other words, federal law does not preclude the plaintiffs
from asserting state law claims. Further, according to Judge Chhabria, federal law
does not govern the plaintiffs’ claim, and therefore this case could avoid the federal
displacement doctrine.132 The decision cites only a few instances where federal law
will preclude state law, and only narrow circumstances justify removing a state law
case to federal court.133

https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolefisher/2018/10/18/opioid-lawsuits-on-par-to-becomelargest-civil-litigation-agreement-in-u-s-history/ [https://perma.cc/RV5D-4FEF]; Joanna
Walters, Sackler Family Members Face Mass Litigation and Criminal Investigations over
Opioid Crisis, GUARDIAN, (Nov. 19, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/nov/19/sackler-family-members-face-mass-litigation-criminal-investigationsover-opioids-crisis [https://perma.cc/UR2P-WPVW] (noting the Sackler family which own
Purdue Pharma, one of the manufacturers of OxyContin, is facing class action litigation);
Cassandra Bassler, Suffolk County Sues Purdue Pharma Family over Opioids, NPR NEWS
(Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.wshu.org/post/suffolk-county-sues-purdue-pharma-familyover-opioids#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/U8U7-AZBV].
129
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“The
scope of plaintiffs’ theory is breathtaking. It would reach the sale of fossil fuels anywhere in
the world, including all past and otherwise lawful sales, where the seller knew that the
combustion of fossil fuels contributed to the phenomenon of global warming.”), appeal
pending, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020).
130
Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal 2018),
appeal filed sub nom., Cty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-15503 (9th Cir. Mar. 27,
2018).
131
Cty. of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937.
132
Id.
133
The opinion cites instances of “complete pre-emption” by a specified federal statute.
Id. It also cites the Grable jurisdiction as requiring the defendants to cite specific instances
of federal law. Id. at 938. The opinion also notes that the savings clause in the Clean Air Act
“preserve[s] state causes of action and suggest[s] that Congress did not intend federal causes
of action . . . ‘to be exclusive.’” Id. at 938 (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. §7604(e)
(2018) (Clean Air Act Savings Clause). The Clean Water Act contains a similar savings
clause. See 33 U.S.C. §§1365(e), 1370 (2018).
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The County of San Mateo opinion provides important insights into how other
claims made against carbon-major corporations in the second group of cases, and
also future cases, may be decided. In 2018, U.S. states and cities filed several new
suits that have not yet resulted in orders or judgments. In April 2018, the Board of
County Commissioners of Boulder County, Colorado, along with the City of
Boulder, initiated several claims against carbon-major companies for public and
private nuisance, trespass, deceptive trade practices, and violations of the Colorado
Consumer Protection Act.134 In May 2018, King County in Washington State filed a
suit against the five largest fossil fuel corporations for coastal harms, flooding, storm
surge and decreased mountain snowpack.135 In July 2018, the State of Rhode Island
and the Mayor and City of Baltimore filed similar suits against fossil fuel companies
citing public and private nuisance, strict liability for failure to warn and design
defect, negligence design defect, and breaches of the Rhode Island State
Environmental Rights Act136 and Maryland Consumer Protection Act.137 Litigants in
this second group are clearly responding to the failure of the first wave and crafting
their pleadings more directly to invoke state law.
In all of these cases, the corporate defendants submitted motions (with varying
degrees of success) to remove the cases to federal court on the grounds that they
involved a significant question of federal common law and federal energy law
policies.138 Federal preemption of state law claims is likely to be a significant issue
134

Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 405 F.
Supp. 3d 947, 954–55 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-1330 (10th Cir. Sept. 9,
2019). This case was filed in Colorado state court in April 2018. First Complaint, Board of
Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., No. 2018CV30349 (Dist. Ct.,
Cty. of Boulder, Colo., filed April 17, 2018). However, the case was removed by the
defendants to federal court in June 2018. Notice of Removal, Board of Cty. Comm’rs of
Boulder Cty., 405 F. Supp. 3d at 954 (No. 1:18-cv-01672). In September 2019, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado granted the Plaintiff’s motion to remand to state
court. Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cty., 405 F. Supp. 3d at 954. For a full history of
this case, see Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.),
Inc., SABIN CTR., http://climatecasechart.com/case/board-of-county-commissioners-ofboulder-county-v-suncor-energy-usa-inc/ [https://perma.cc/VT9M-FCYH] (last visited Nov.
10, 2019).
135
First Amended Complaint at 1, King Cty. V. BP P.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-00758-RSL
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2018) Doc. 113.
136
Complaint at 115–139, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I.
Super. Ct., Providence/Bristol Cty., filed July 2, 2018).
137
Complaint, Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct.,
Baltimore City, filed July 20, 2018). In addition, in November 2018 a group of crab
fishermen in California sued 30 oil and gas companies for damage to their livelihoods due to
global warming induced algae blooms which have shortened the crab season. See Complaint
at 1, Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., No. CGC-18-571285
(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018).
138
See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F.Supp.3d 538 (D. Md. 2019) (No.
1:18CV02357), aff’d, No. 19-1644 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2020) (remanding from federal court to
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in all of these cases and, therefore, a number of these cases may stand or fall together.
In October 2018, King County was granted its request for a stay in proceedings until
the Ninth Circuit appeal of the San Francisco and Oakland case was decided.139 In
March 2020, the appeal by carbon-majors to remove the Baltimore suit to federal
court was denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s remand order that the suit remain in state court.140
Courts in some of the recent climate cases have agreed that state common law claims
are not completely preempted, because the Savings Clause in the Clean Air Act’s
Citizen Suit section “preserve[s] state causes of action and suggest[s] that Congress
did not intend federal causes of action . . . to be exclusive.”141
While these cases are at the appellate and preliminary stages, respectively, they
do provide evidence of a growing trend of corporate climate litigation in the United
States—the increasing reliance on climate attribution science and state-based claims.
Moreover, the Third Circuit case of Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station
demonstrates that federal preemption under the Clean Air Act may not be a bar to
state-based claims.142 This case could be applied to GHG emissions, allowing state
common law-based claims regarding intrastate emissions, but it would likely not
apply to interstate emissions.143 If this analysis is correct, then the federal preemption
state court); Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F.Supp. 3d 142, 146 (D.R.I. 2019) (No.
1:18-cv-00395-WES-LDA) (remanding from federal court to state court).
139
See Order Granting Partially Unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings at 2–3, King
Cty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-00758 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2018), Doc. 138.
140
Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 19-1644 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2020), aff’g 388
F.Supp.3d 538 (D. Md. 2019).
141
Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal 2018)
(emphasis added); see also Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F.Supp.3d 538, 553–55
(D. Md. 2019), aff’d, No. 19-1644 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2020).
142
734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1149 (2014). In Bell, a
community surrounding a Pennsylvania power-generating station complained that fly ash
and unburned coal settled on their property, causing a considerable nuisance. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Clean Air Act did not preempt the plaintiffs’
case. The case pointed specifically to the savings clause of the Clean Air Act, which
preserves causes of action despite the comprehensive scope of the Act, allows states to adopt
or enforce more progressive standards for emissions, and specifically also allows citizen
suits. Id. at 197 (discussing 42 U.S.C. §7604(e) (2012)). For an analysis of Bell, see
generally, Samantha Caravello, Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 465 (2014) (analyzing the Third Circuit’s Decision and arguing that the decision served
important functions).
143
Bell followed a case revolving around the savings clause under the Clean Water Act,
(the savings clause under the Clean Water Act is largely similar to that of the Clean Air Act),
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987). Ouellette states that while
the Clean Water Act’s savings clause allows states to impose higher standards on water
sources within their borders, and individuals are not preempted from bringing claims under
state law, it only applies to sources of pollution within that state and not to pollution sources
within a different state.
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hurdle will have been removed. However, the Bell case also creates difficulties. Even
if they are successful in avoiding federal preemption, state-based claims are unlikely
to be successful given the international and interstate nature of GHG emissions.144
In order for these new common law tort suits to be successful on the argument
around interstate emissions, courts and plaintiffs will likely need to take a more
innovative approach to tort law. State tort law can fill the gap in the statutory regime
by providing a compensatory remedy to individuals, which the Clean Air Act does
not.145 This is illustrated by a new development in the second wave of corporate
climate litigation—one industry suing another industry over climate impacts. In
2018, the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association submitted a claim
based on public state-based nuisance, negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn
against a number of carbon-major corporations for damage caused to their industry
from the impacts of climate change.146 A number of academics are skeptical of the
utility of tort law in climate litigation,147 and Kysar has suggested that climate
change, due to its diffuse and disparate nature and effects, constitutes a
“paradigmatic antitort.”148 However, the legally disruptive nature of climate change
144
For example, the district courts in the New York and Oakland cases rejected
Plaintiffs’ attempts to avoid dismissal by arguing that emissions are occurring globally and
are thus not entirely addressed by the Clean Air Act. The courts explained that even if the
Clean Air Act did not displace claims alleging harm from international emissions, such
claims would still be barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality, which counsels
against “unwarranted judicial interference” when a claim “reaches conduct within the
territory of another sovereign.” See City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017,
1025 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117
(2013)), appeal pending, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020); see also City of New
York v. BP, P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[T]o the extent that the City
seeks to hold Defendants liable for damages stemming from foreign greenhouse gas
emissions, the City’s claims are barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality . . . .”),
appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. argued Nov. 22, 2019).
145
Caravello, supra note 142, at 475.
146
Complaint at 76–89, Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron
Corp., No. CGC-18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018). See the full history of this case
at Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., SABIN CTR.,
http://climatecasechart.com/case/pacific-coast-federation-of-fishermens-associations-inc-vchevron-corp/ [https://perma.cc/TC5R-VAKG] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
147
See generally Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
1295 (2009) (arguing that climate change policy is made more difficult to craft due to the
delayed effects of climate change); Laurence H. Tribe et al., Too Hot for Courts to Handle
Fuel Temperature, Global Warming and the Political Question Doctrine (Wash. Legal
Found. Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series No. 169, 2010), https://s3.us-east2.amazonaws.com/washlegal-uploads/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP
.pdf [https://perma.cc/24BJ-HGTF] (detailing a number of issues of climate change litigation
focused around two major problems stemming from concerns about temperature and its
chemical and climactic effects).
148
Donald Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4
(2011).
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could mean that tort law will evolve to take into account climate change.149
Developments in climate science show the contributions of companies to climate
impacts and may be sufficient to overcome causation hurdles.150
Even if these cases are not successful, climate litigation could serve as a series
of “prods and pleas,”151 effectively calling attention to the inadequacies of existing
legal approaches to climate change. Kysar notes that even if climate litigation efforts
fail, the use of tort law can contribute to a larger ecosystem of governance
institutions, and judicial engagement helps frame litigants’ suffering and calls public
attention to the issue.152 The effects of climate change are certainly being felt in the
cities and states bringing the suits, with large financial consequences for government
entities, which are having to pay for adaptation actions, even if the emissions are
being made elsewhere.153 The international nature of emissions did not hinder the
Court in the RWE case in Germany,154 and that case could eventually influence U.S.
courts as well.
International judicial decisions are referring to and relying on each other, and
consequentially inspiring further climate litigation in other jurisdictions. Indeed, the
plaintiffs in RWE referred to the Dutch Urgenda case, itself an example of
“progressive legal reasoning and development” and “ambitious evolution of
doctrine,”155 particularly in the area of causation.156 The 2015 Urgenda case neatly
glided over the causation hurdles of past cases by stating that a sufficient causal link
can be presumed to exist between Dutch emissions and global climate change, even

149

Fisher et al., supra note 39, at 190.
See supra Section II.B.
151
See generally Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limiting
Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011) (evaluating three
potential obstacles to merits adjudication in the context of how federal and state tort law
interacts with climate change).
152
Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation
Mechanism, 9 EUR. J. RISK REG. 48, 50 (2018).
153
See Complaint at 3–6, Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron
Corp., No. CGC-18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018) (describing the deprivation of
substantive portions of revenue for crab fisheries as well as wholesalers and processers
during the 2015–2018 seasons, as well as indirect losses such as loss of commercial fishing
lifestyles, identity, and loss of public confidence in the safety and quality of crab products).
154
5. Zivilsenat des Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG] [Fifth Division for Civil Matters
of the Higher Regional Court of Hamm] Nov. 30, 2017 (Ger.)
155
Fisher et al., supra note 39, at 191.
156
See The Urgenda Climate Case Against the Dutch Government, URGENDA,
https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case [https://perma.cc/6FS5-LCFX] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2019). The Urgenda case was brought by a Dutch nongovernmental organization
(NGO) claiming that the Dutch state should, by 2030, reduce its GHG emissions by at least
25% below 1990 levels, which would achieve the proportion of emissions agreed in an EU
burden-sharing emissions agreement. The NGO was successful, and the government
appealed. The English translation of the case is forthcoming.
150

2020]

ROAD TO PARIS RUNS THROUGH DELAWARE

345

though Dutch emissions constitute a small fraction of global emissions.157 In October
2018, the Hague Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that failure of the Dutch
government to reduce its emissions to 25% below 1990 levels by 2030 would
constitute a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.158 The original
decision in 2015 had already inspired similar litigation in the European Union and
beyond,159 and the appellate decision is likely to lead to progressive regulatory
change within the EU.
The interaction between these judgments discussed above points to a global
conversation carried on by courts on the issue of causation, whether through torts,
constitutional human rights, or private law mechanisms. Whether the RWE case’s
approach to partial causation will be relied upon in the United States or cases in other
jurisdictions against carbon-major corporations remains to be seen. Nonetheless, it
seems likely that, as European courts and courts in other countries hold carbon
majors accountable, U.S. localities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
individuals will continue to pursue claims in U.S. courts. Further, multinational
corporations such as carbon-majors are sensitive to progressive decisions in other
jurisdictions due to the global reach of their operations.160 Litigation risk will persist
for carbon-majors, even if the second wave of litigation is unsuccessful.
Beyond litigation risk, regulatory proposals are emerging. In September 2018,
U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed the Climate Risk Disclosure Act, which
would require disclosure to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of
a corporation’s total fossil fuel-related assets, how those assets would be affected by

157

Rechtbank den Haag 24 juni 2015, m.nt. (Urgenda Foundation/The State of the
Netherlands) (unofficial English translation) (Neth.).
158
Hof den Haag 09 oktober 2018, m.nt. (Urgenda Foundation/The State of the
Netherlands) (upheld by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in December 2019, No.
HAZA C/09/456689) (Neth.).
159
For example, in 2019, NGOs in The Netherlands sued Shell on behalf of 30,000
people in 70 countries to legally compel them to reduce emissions. See FRIENDS OF THE
EARTH INTERNATIONAL, Netherlands: Activists Sue Shell over Climate Change, BUSINESS &
HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/netherlands-activists-sue-shell-over-climate-change [https://perma.cc/
KZL2-WRZ9] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). The Urgenda case has also inspired litigation
around the world on similar grounds in: the United Kingdom, Plan B and Others v. Secretary
of State for Transport (2019) EWHC 1070; France, Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v.
France (letter of formal notice filed Dec. 17, 2018), and Commune de Grande-Synthe v.
France (filed January 2019)); Ireland, Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. The Gov’t.
of Ireland (decided Sept. 19, 2019); and Switzerland, Union of Swiss Senior Women for
Climate Protection v. Swiss Federal Council and Others, No. A-2992/2017.
160
See generally Lisa Benjamin, The Responsibilities of Corporations: New Directions
in Environmental Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Veerle Heyveart and Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli eds. forthcoming,
2020).
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climate change, and how directors are managing climate risks to those assets.161 In
January 2019, Rep. Deutch Theodore reintroduced the Energy Innovation and
Carbon Dividend Act to price carbon, provide revenue to households, and reduce
domestic greenhouse gas emissions 90 percent by 2050.162 In addition, the Green
New Deal has attracted significant public attention. While the resolution in its
current form is broad, it proposes a set of economic stimulus programs designed to
address both climate change and economic inequality.163 It aims for net-zero
emissions through decarbonizing the electricity grid, transportation systems, and
industry.164 The Democratic Party is also considering making climate change a
fundamental platform in the 2020 federal election in order to appeal to younger
voters.165 These regulatory approaches would certainly provide a more
comprehensive and systemic approach to climate change than courts can provide,
but may be slower to emerge in the United States than in other jurisdictions.166 Even
161

See Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, S. 2075, 116th Cong. (2019); see also
Karen Savage, New Bill Would Require the SEC to Police Companies’ Climate Risks,
CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/09/
20/climate-risks-disclosure-sec-elizabeth-warren/ [https://perma.cc/WQD5-YSD2]. The
recent experience with European privacy laws and data protection is also illustrative. The
EU General Data Protection Regulation has introduced sweeping changes in the management
of personal data, along with significant fines which may have implications for U.S.
corporations with operations in the EU. Justin Jaffe & Laura Hautala, What the GDPR Means
for Facebook, the EU and You, CNET.COM (May 25, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/howto/what-gdpr-means-for-facebook-google-the-eu-us-and-you/
[https://perma.cc/3YESQRDR].
162
H.R. Res. 763, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Steve Valk, Climate Action: Bipartisan
Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Bill Reintroduced in Congress, RED GREEN &
BLUE (Jan. 24, 2019), http://redgreenandblue.org/2019/01/24/climate-action-bipartisanenergy-innovation-carbon-dividend-bill-reintroduced-congress
[https://perma.cc/L62CFGK7].
163
H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019) (“Recognizing the duty of the federal
government to create a green new deal”); Lisa Friedman, What Is the Green New Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/climate/green-new-dealquestions-answers.html [https://perma.cc/G74T-8EUN].
164
Id.
165
Coral Davenport & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pressed by Climate Activists, Senate
Democrats Plan to ‘Go on Offense,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/politics/senate-democrats-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/6QHF-9F24].
166
A comprehensive treatment of state and federal action on climate change is beyond
the scope of this Article, but it is clear that, despite existing federal hurdles on climate
regulation, regulatory action is occurring at the state and local levels. For example, Colorado
updated its Climate Action Plan in 2018, incorporating a 2017 Executive Order’s goal to
reduce GHG emissions by 26% by 2025. See H.B. 1261 (codified at COLO REV. STAT. §257-102 (2019) (updating original 2007 version); see also Colorado Climate Plan 2018
Update- State Level Policies and Strategies to Mitigate and Adapt, ADAPTATION
CLEARINGHOUSE (July 2018), https://www.adaptationclearinghouse.org/resources/colorado-
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if this second wave of climate litigation faces setbacks or missteps, its effects,
combined with the changing balance of the risks of climate change to corporations,
will still be felt within corporate law.
III. NEW RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CORPORATE ACTORS
The impacts of climate change are increasing, and, with them, the risks to
corporations are rising. Climate impacts and risks entail financial costs for
corporations, but climate change also provides opportunities to corporations through
a transition to clean energy. Private law can make substantive contributions to
climate change and the global energy transition away from fossil fuels. Corporate
directors’ duties are purposefully open-textured and able to advance and change
depending on evolving industry norms and standards.167 Increasing climate impacts
have implications for the interpretation of fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties remain
“largely agnostic” on climate change, allowing directors and officers significant
flexibility in how they approach transitions away from fossil fuels.168 Fiduciary
climate-plan-2018-update-state-level-policies-and-strategies-to-mitigate-and-adapt.html
[https://perma.cc/M5AX-FWM8] (explaining the update to Colorado’s 2007 Climate Plan).
In addition, North Carolina plans to cut GHG emissions by 40% by 2025. Governor of N.C.
Exec. Order No. 80, N.C.’s Commitment to Address Climate Change & Transition to a Clean
Energy Economy (Oct. 29, 2018); see also Climate Change, N.C. DEPT. OF ENVTL. QUALITY,
https://deq.nc.gov/energy-climate/climate-change [https://perma.cc/UV68-UZ2R] (last
visited Sept. 29, 2019). Oregon has committed to reducing GHG emissions by 10% below
1990 levels by 2020, and by 75% below 1990 levels by 2050. OR. REV. STAT. §468A.205
(2019); see also Accelerating Efficiency in Oregon’s Built Environment to Reduce
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Address Climate Change, Or. Exec. Order 17-20 (2017),
https://www.oregon.gov/gov/Documents/executive_orders/eo_17-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/
23X3-PPUW]. Moreover, California has also adopted a goal of transitioning to 100% clean
electricity power by 2045. See Camila Domonoske, California Sets Goal of 100 Percent
Clean Electric Power by 2045, NPR (Sept. 10, 2018, 3:59 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/646373423/california-sets-goal-of-100-percent-renewable
-electric-power-by-2045 [https://perma.cc/B8T9-H3FN]. California also has a statutory
commitment to reduce the state’s emissions by 40% below 1990 levels by the year 2030,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566 (West 2017), as well as a comprehensive set of
climate change legislation. See California Climate Change Legislation, CALIFORNIA
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.climatechange.ca.gov/state/legislation.html [https://perma.
cc/6WB8-5E69] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). For a list of resources on state and municipal
climate action, see State and Local Climate Change Resource Center, SABIN CTR. FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE L., http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/archived-materials/stateand-local-climate-change-resource-center/ [https://perma.cc/L24C-59KU] (last visited Sept.
29, 2019).
167
Joan M. Hemingway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes,
Decisional Law and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 947 (2017)
(explaining broad definition of corporate director’s duties in Delaware, the Model Business
Corporations Act, and across other states).
168
Hari M. Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, 94 IND. L. J. 595, 638 (2019).
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duties provide directors with sufficient flexibility to accommodate climate risks.
Directors have obligations to both assess and keep informed of risks to their
business, and consequentially to share this information with investors.
A. Increasing Climate Risks for Carbon-Majors
Climate change and the failure of mitigation and adaptation efforts taken
together consistently rank in the top five global risks assessed by the World
Economic Forum in the past several years.169 The risks of climate change are
estimated to impact a significant portion of global assets, negatively impacting
global fiscal stability, with up to 30% of global manageable assets at risk.170 Between
now and the end of the century, this could lead to between four to forty-three trillion
dollars’ worth of assets at risk.171
Climate risk can be separated into two main categories for corporations: (1) the
risks of transitioning to a lower-carbon economy, which may involve policy or
regulatory changes, as well as litigation, technology, market changes, and
reputational risks; and (2) the physical risks to operational assets of businesses,
which may be both acute and event-driven, as well as chronic, due to slow impacts
of climate change such as sea-level rise.172 In terms of the physical risks of climate
change, the Fourth National Climate Assessment has estimated that “[m]ore frequent
and intense extreme weather [events] and climate-related events” will “continue to
damage infrastructure,” property, and labor productivity, and in the energy arena
will reduce the efficiency of power generation.173 Climate impacts will also affect
U.S. trade and the broader economy, disrupting operations and supply chains both
domestically and internationally, with annual losses in some economic sectors
reaching the hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of the century.174
While climate change threatens a wide variety of industries, the energy and
fossil fuel industries are particularly vulnerable. The energy infrastructures of
productive, refinement- and distribution-focused corporations are often located in
169
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2018 2, Fig. I (13th ed.
2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A9V62AG] (ranking failure of climate change adaptation and mitigation fifth out of top ten global
risks in terms of likelihood, and fourth in top ten risks in terms of impact in 2018).
170
Global manageable assets are the total stock of assets held by non-bank financial
institutions. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 29, at 8.
171
Id. at 2; Allie Goldstein et al., The Private Sector’s Climate Change Risk and
Adaptation Blind Spots, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 18, 18 (2018).
172
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, supra note 30, at 5–
6.
173
U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT: VOLUME II IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES ii, 26
(2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DBA9-2QKQ].
174
Id.
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coastal areas and are vulnerable to sea-level rise, storm surges, and flooding.175
Decreased water and power supplies will also affect energy companies that rely on
these resources for the extraction and exploitation of fossil fuels.176 Their employees
and customers will also be negatively affected.177
Climate change also poses a new and intensified set of risks for the fossil fuel
industry from government policies and legislation, financial restrictions by lenders
and insurers, and hostile legal and shareholder actions.178 These companies can
expect increased asset devaluations and increasing insurance and commodity
costs.179 They are also facing changing geopolitical conditions with declining
fortunes of petrostates, and challenges from new technology.180 Financial risks are
also increasing, from stranded assets, divestment, and reduced wealth of fossil fuel
exporting countries, with investor-owned firms in the developed world likely to feel
the impacts of these cumulative risks sooner.181
The risks of climate change are not distant future risks; carbon-majors are
feeling the effects of climate change now. Natural disasters in 2017 in the United
States caused over $300 billion in damage nationwide, with effects being felt acutely
in Texas and Florida.182 Energy companies operating in the Gulf of Mexico were
particularly badly hit and continue to be worried about extreme events.183 Melting
permafrost in the Artic also disrupts transportation routes, therefore limiting
operating capacity and increasing operational costs for extractive corporations
175

Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 192–93.
177
Id. at 30.
178
Krane, supra note 49, at 2–3.
179
Perry Wallace, Climate Change, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Law Duties, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 757, 759 (2009).
180
Krane, supra note 49, at 2.
181
Id. (noting, however, that risks will be felt at different time scales across the fossil
fuel industry with coal companies feeling the impacts sooner, and oil industry later as fewer
substitutes are available and transportation will continue to rely on oil).
182
CDP, STATE BY STATE: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. COMPANIES AND CITIES ACROSS
SEVEN STATES 4 (Dec. 2018), https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03
fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/003/940/original/CDP_State_by_S
tate_2018.pdf?1547134684 [https://perma.cc/5J8K-RG23].
183
Id. Noble Energy stated that the financial impacts of extreme weather events and
damages would not be fully recoverable for its operations in the Gulf due to insufficient
insurance and could negatively impact revenue. Dipka Bhambhani, Energy Companies
Could Feel the Effects of Climate Change on Their Bottom Lines, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2018,
1:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dipkabhambhani/2018/10/25/energy-companiesfeel-the-effects-of-climate-change-where-it-hurts-the-bottom-line/#69cd1a952199 [https://
perma.cc/H4YU-EYK3]. ExxonMobil incurred $135 million dollars of costs due to property
damage caused by flood debris damaging a pipeline under Yellowstone river in Montana.
Matthew Brown, Oil Spill: Yellowstone Spill to Cost Exxon $135M, BILLINGS GAZETTE
(Nov. 4, 2011), https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/yellowstone-spill-to-cost-exxonm/article_b231f3f4-0726-11e1-ada7-001cc4c03286.html [https://perma.cc/KFS2-NFNH].
176
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onshore.184 Risks extend internationally as well for these corporations with capital
intensive operating structures and assets situated in some of the most vulnerable
parts of the world to climate change.185 While energy companies are some of the
most exposed to climate risk, they demonstrate limited recognition, at least publicly,
to physical and other climate risks.186
The assumption that companies are failing to account for climate risk has been
borne out by quantitative research by Goldstein looking at 1,630 large companies’
voluntary reporting on climate change to investors.187 The report concludes that
companies were not adequately characterizing climate risk in their voluntary
reporting or adequately preparing for its impacts.188 The authors found that the
potential magnitude of the financial impacts of climate risk was a key blind spot for
companies.189 Directors and managers were also failing to account for indirect and
systemic characteristics of climate risk.190 Companies are focusing only on a narrow
view of climate risk, perhaps in part due to a predisposition to short-term thinking,
the tendency to heavily discount future costs, and the potential of disclosure of
climate risks to lead to a corporate disadvantage in the short term.191 Short-term
thinking is cited as one of the most entrenched barriers to progressive climate action
by corporations.192 However, climate change is posing both risks and opportunities
for corporations, and new research points to opportunities, even for carbon-majors,
in the transition away from fossil fuels, as discussed in the next section.

184
Bhambhani, supra note 183. It should also be noted that while climate change may
be limiting onshore drilling, climate change is also breaking up arctic sea ice and opening up
new opportunities for offshore drilling in the Arctic.
185
ANDREW HOWARD & MARC HASSLER, SCHRODERS, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE
FORGOTTEN PHYSICAL RISKS 2 (July 2018), https://www.schroders.com/en/sysglobalassets/
_global-shared-blocks/climate-change/physical-risks.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WNWQ4MA].
186
Id.
187
Goldstein et al., supra note 171, at 18.
188
Id.
189
Id. It should be noted that the insurance industry has been one of the first-movers on
climate action, due to their high exposure. See, e.g., ALLIANZ GROUP & WORLD WILDLIFE
FUND, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES,
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 3 (2006), http://www.climateneeds.umd.edu/pdf/AllianzWWF
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSQ7-MALT].
190
Goldstein et al., supra note 171, at 20–21, 23. While the authors focused only on
physical risks, they compared the estimated price tag of climate change in the trillions of
dollars with the aggregate financial risks reported from companies which only amounted to
tens of billions of dollars. Id. at 20.
191
Id. at 23.
192
Infra Section IV.B.
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B. Increasing Climate Opportunities for Carbon-Majors
Even for carbon-major corporations, energy transitions away from fossil fuels
can be profitable. A recent report by Goldman Sachs highlights the opportunities of
a transition to a low carbon economy for global energy markets, and in particular,
for ‘Big Oils,’ being the largest carbon-major corporations.193
The report anticipates that as a result of a lack of funding from financial
institutions for oil and gas projects in the near future, as well as key parts of the oil
value chain becoming stranded assets, the market in oil and gas will tighten.194 The
report notes that, in the short-term, tightening financial conditions for hydrocarbons
may lead to higher returns for Big Oils as they consolidate their grip on this industry;
however, in the longer-term, the report argues that this funding could be used by Big
Oils to convert their business to Big Energy.195 This could be achieved by leveraging
their competitive advantages in global supply chain management, technical
expertise, and global footprints to replicate vertical integration in energy by
purchasing utilities and providing energy from diversified sources, including
biofuels and renewables.196 Most importantly, this report highlights the business case
for transition, stating that the blended returns on these new investments could be
materially higher than returns in the past decade on just oil and gas.197
The second wave of litigation also highlights the risks of climate change to
investors in these corporations. Armed with more and better information about
climate risk, investors could also put increased pressure on directors to act on the
financial risks and opportunities posed by climate change. A recent report from
Wood Mckenzie connects increasing pressure from investors for transparency
regarding emissions to capital market responses.198 The report notes that investors
will increasingly seek new instruments for green social investments. Combined with
drivers of the transition to renewables and electrification of transport, the report
estimates that a “point of singularity” will emerge in 2035, where the global energy
193

See generally GOLDMAN SACHS, RE-IMAGINING BIG OILS HOW ENERGY COMPANIES
CAN SUCCESSFULLY ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2018), https://www.goldmansachs.com/
insights/pages/reports/re-imagining-big-oils-f/re-imagining-big-oils-report-pdf.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GX4L-FN4W] (explaining the role that Big Oil has in producing greenhouse gas
emissions and detailing ways that Big Oil can help with de-carbonization).
194
Id. at 15. Although it should be noted that in the natural gas industry U.S. markets
are flooded and prices are expected to stay low for some time. Ryan Dezember, U.S. Glut in
Natural-Gas Supply Goes Global, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2019, 3:11 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-glut-in-natural-gas-supply-goes-global-11566907200
[https://perma.cc/J3Q9-A6XY].
195
GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 193, at 3.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
WOOD MACKENZIE, THINKING GLOBAL ENERGY TRANSITIONS: THE WHAT, IF, HOW
AND WHEN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Jun. 2018), https://www.woodmac.com/reports/macro
economics-risks-and-global-trends-thinking-global-energy-transitions-the-what-if-how-and
-when-23699 [https://perma.cc/3R69-B7H6].
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transition away from fossil fuels will be unstoppable and new energy sources will
become the dominant choice for investments.199
This transition will be supported by an “almost ubiquitous” societal push
towards a sustainable future.200 The global energy transition is information that
directors cannot afford to ignore while maintaining their managerial decisions and
capital investment choices safely within the realm of compliance with fiduciary
duties. Institutional investors are well-resourced and experienced litigants,201 and
corporate lawsuits could become increasingly popular if directors do not take the
risks of climate change to their businesses more seriously and do not consider energy
transitions as part of their strategic business plans. Research that demonstrates the
financial benefits of the global energy transition specifically for carbon-major
corporations takes the issue beyond zero-sum environmentalism,202 to a legitimate
business decision. Therefore, the risks of climate change combined with the business
case for transition may lead to cleaner energy choices by directors.
Despite the opportunities for transition available to carbon-major corporations,
they have largely failed to seize these opportunities. The response has been uneven,
with Shell recently announcing short-term caps on emissions as a result of investor
pressure,203 but with most U.S.-based carbon-majors, such as ExxonMobil, doubling
down on investments in fossil fuels, and ignoring the risks of climate change to their
businesses and to society.204 This renewed investment in fossil fuels is based on the
perception that efforts to reduce emissions undermine short-term commercial
opportunities to monetize existing fossil fuel reserves.205 However, the failure of
climate policy is likely to broaden risks across the global economy and increase risks
to assets of carbon-majors.206 These short-term decisions leave carbon-major
directors even more exposed to continued climate litigation.

199

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
201
Ganguly et al., supra note 21, at 21.
202
See generally Shalanda Baker et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ENV.
L. REP. 4 (2017).
203
Shell Agrees to Set Short-Term Caps on Carbon Emissions, FIN. POST (Dec. 3, 2018,
3:06 PM), https://business.financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/shell-agrees-to-set-shortterm-caps-on-carbon-emissions [https://perma.cc/X7WK-NARA].
204
Crude Awakening, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2019), https://gbr.businessreview.glo
bal/articles/view/5c6f7846c5be1300076c9094 [https://perma.cc/VYS6-MWG9].
205
Krane, supra note 49, at 1.
206
Id. at 3.
200
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C. Corporate Law-Based Climate Litigation
Several suits and investigations have been launched in the United States that
involve corporate and securities law, including securities disclosure claims,207 as
well as investigations by the New York and Massachusetts Attorneys General.208
207

While this article focuses on directors’ fiduciary duties, the fiduciary duties of
pension fund managers has also been litigated and recently dismissed by a Texas court. In
Fentress v. ExxonMobil Corp, a class action suit was brought by employees of the Exxon
Savings Plan on the basis that senior corporate officers of the company, who were fiduciaries
of the employee stock pension plan, knew or should have known that the stock was
artificially inflated due to the risks of climate change. 304 F. Supp. 3d 569, 572 (S.D. Tex.
2018). The plaintiffs claimed that the pension managers purchased $800 million worth of
Exxon stocks despite the climate change risks, and the company should have written down
its assets as stranded, claiming this was a breach of the duty of prudence, which required
fiduciaries to manage the assets with care, skill, prudence and diligence pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1104(a)(1)(B). Fentress, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 573–74. A motion to dismiss by Exxon on
March 30, 2018 was granted by the Texas court on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to show
the risks of climate change had not already been included in the stock price. Id. at 580, 587.
Relying on the efficient market hypothesis, the judge decided that the markets could take
into account public information on climate change, and the plaintiffs had not plausibly linked
the realities of climate change to the future health of an oil and gas company. Id. at 576–79.
The issue of fiduciary duties for pension fund managers became a relevant one in the case,
with the plaintiffs having to prove that the duty of prudence had been violated on the basis
of non-public information. Id. at 580–81. In order to prove a breach of fiduciary duty, the
plaintiffs would have to prove that an alternative action was available that was so clearly
beneficial that a prudent fiduciary could not conclude it would be more likely to harm the
fund than help it. Id. The plaintiffs put forward three alternative actions: corrective
disclosures regarding Exxon’s reserves, halting new purchase orders of Exxon stock, and
investing in low-cost hedging stock. Id. at 574. These were all dismissed as inappropriate by
the judge on the basis that corrective disclosures and freezing stock trading would ultimately
lower the price of the stock and could do more harm than good. Id. at 580–87. While
unsuccessful here, more suits regarding lack of disclosure by private plaintiffs in the context
of fiduciary duties are likely to continue where stock prices drop.
208
In November 2015, the New York Attorney General served Exxon with a subpoena
pursuant to N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 63(12) (Consol. 2019), N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2302(a)
(Consol. 2019), and the Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2019)). Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Schneiderman, 316 F. Supp. 3d 679, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Together, these
laws prohibit fraudulent practices in connection with securities sold in New York. See id.
New York also subpoenaed PricewaterhouseCoopers in August 2016 in connection with the
Exxon Mobil investigation. Decision & Order at 1, People v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
No. 451962/16 (N.Y.S. Oct. 26, 2016), Doc. 41. New York’s investigation is designed to
discover whether Exxon’s historical securities filings were misleading because they failed to
disclose Exxon’s internal projections regarding the potential costs of both climate change
and climate change regulation to the company. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
to Compel Compliance with Investigative Subpoena at 3–6, People v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 451962/2016 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2016), Doc. 38.
In April 2016, the Massachusetts Attorney General served Exxon with a Civil Investigative
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This section will focus on a new case that turned on fiduciary duties in the context
of securities disclosures and corporate statements about climate risks. In 2017, a suit
was launched regarding misleading Exxon reserves in Ramirez v. ExxonMobil.209
The plaintiffs in Ramirez were successful at the pleadings stage, and the suit is
continuing. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, in August
2018, held that the plaintiffs, the Greater Pennsylvania Carpenters Pension Fund,
successfully pleaded alleged material misrepresentations or omissions constituting
securities fraud by ExxonMobil and a breach of the duty of loyalty by a number of
its corporate directors and officers, regarding losses attributed to publicly traded
stock acquired between 2014 and 2017.210 These losses were attributed by the
plaintiffs to the failure by the directors and financial officers of ExxonMobil to
recognize and inform investors of the business risks of climate change, and the value
impairment of unconventional fossil fuel operations in the Canadian tar sands, the
Rocky Mountain Dry Gas Operation, and Kearl Operations.211 The directors’ actions
led, in 2016, to the company disclosing that 20% of its once proved reserves were
no longer economically feasible, and therefore fell outside of the SEC definition of
proved reserves, leading to a $2 billion impairment announcement in 2017.212
Demand pursuing fraudulent claims similar to those pursued by the New York Attorney
General. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney General, 94 N.E. 786, 790 (Mass. 2018). The
Massachusetts Attorney General requested from Exxon documents regarding whether the
potential for stranded assets should have been disclosed. See Brief of Appellee Office of the
Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 14–15, Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Attorney General, 94 N.E. 786 (Mass. 2018) (No. SJC-12376). In response, Exxon sued the
Attorneys General of New York and Massachusetts for abuse of process, civil conspiracy
and violations of Exxon’s constitutional rights to free speech. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Schneiderman, 316 F. Supp. 3d 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Exxon claimed the investigations
were designed to “silence and intimidate one side of the public policy debate on how to
address climate change.” Id. at 688. A decision in March 2018 in the United States district
court in New York provided a scathing order dismissing the motions by Exxon as a “wild
stretch of logic.” Id. at 689. In spite of Exxon’s judicial protests, it appears that these
investigations might bear fruit, as the Attorney General of New York recently settled with
Peabody Energy, requiring a restatement of its financial disclosures. Press Release, New
York Attorney General, A.G. Schneiderman Secures Unprecedented Agreement with
Peabody Energy to End Misleading Statements and Disclose Risks Arising from Climate
Change (Nov. 9, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-securesunprecedented-agreement-peabody-energy-end-misleading [https://perma.cc/PFN9-SRKL].
In October 2018, the New York Attorney General filed a lawsuit against Exxon for
defrauding investors over the financial risks of climate change due to changing climate
change regulation. Summons & Complaint at 1, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp, No.
452044/2018 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 24, 2018), Doc. 1. However, in December 2019, the court
dismissed New York’s Martin Act claim against Exxon. See Schwartz, supra note 100.
209
Ramirez v. ExxonMobil, 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 840 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
210
Id. at 839–40.
211
Id.
212
ExxonMobil Earns $7.8 Billion in 2016; $1.7 Billion During Fourth Quarter,
EXXONMOBIL, https://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~/media/global/files/earnings/2016/news_rele
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The Ramirez plaintiffs alleged securities fraud under Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and Rule 10b-5.213 The plaintiffs were
successful at pleading material misstatement, including by omission, a breach of the
duty of loyalty by the company and its officers in understating the proxy cost of
carbon used, and for misstatements made in Form 10-K, and in its Corporate
Outlook.214 Their pleading was successful enough to survive a 12(b)(6) motion,
based on assertions that as shareholders they were misled by statements made by
directors and officers in the company’s policy documents.215 These statements were
misleading in that they stated that the company was properly considering the
potential for changing climate regulations as well as carbon asset risks and climate
risks to its business.216
Ramirez focuses specifically on directors’ duties and duties to disclose relevant
information on climate change and climate risk to shareholders in the securities
context. The case is evidence of the growing use and relevance of corporate and
securities law, and more specifically, fiduciary duties in the context of climate
change litigation.217
D. Fiduciary Duties in the Context of Climate Risk
In the absence of takeover circumstances, directors have obligations to manage
the business in the best interests of the corporation and have the flexibility to take a
long-term management approach.218 Fiduciary duties are made up of two primary
ase_earnings_4q16.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV2W-2DWH].
213
Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 839.
214
Id. at 847.
215
Id. at 859.
216
Id.
217
For example, see new shareholder derivative actions in Montini v. Woods and
Colditz v. Woods. See Complaint at 120, Montini v. Woods, No. 3.19-cv-01068-K (N.D. Tex.
May 2, 2019), Doc. 1; Complaint for Petitioner at 121, Colditz v. Woods, No. 3.19-cv-01067
(N.D. Tex. May 2, 2019), Doc. 1.
218
See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 876 (Del. Ch. 1986). The Revlon
doctrine applies in takeover circumstances in Delaware and holds that directors in takeover
circumstances can deviate from the business judgment rule and focus on the short-term
interests of stockholders instead of the long-term interest of the corporation. See Derek J.
Famulari, The Revlon Doctrine – the Fiduciary Duties of Directors when Targets of
Corporate Takeovers and Mergers, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/young_lawyers/publications/101/fiduciary_duties_of_directors_co
porate_takeover.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GMU-LYG6] (last visited Sept. 29,
2019) (discussing Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986)); Joshua Fershee, Is the Revlon Doctrine Creeping into the Business Judgement Rule?
(No), BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (Sept. 17, 2010), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/busin
ess_law/2010/09/is-the-revlon-duty-creeping-into-the-business-judgment-rule-no.html
[https://perma.cc/VX6F-VB2N]; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 783 (2012) (highlighting that given the perpetual existence of
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duties: those of care and loyalty.219 The duty of care requires that directors make
decisions in a carefully considered manner.220 Courts want to know that directors
have considered all material information reasonably available to them, and this now
includes climate risks and opportunities based on the best scientifically available
information and best industry practice.221 The duty of care could be applicable where
directors fail to take into account material information regarding the risks climate
change poses to their businesses, with courts focusing on the process of the directors’
decision-making, and whether the decisions were made in good faith.222
The duty of loyalty, as interpreted by Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v.
Ritter,223 provides that directors have a responsibility to ensure that appropriate
information and reporting systems are established by management to ensure
compliance with key regulatory regimes.224 The duty of loyalty can be violated if
directors demonstrate a conscious disregard for their responsibilities.225 Such
corporations, “immortal investing” should be the guiding principle for corporate directors,
which would have public benefits including acting as stewards for natural resources).
219
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006) (subsuming the duty of good
faith under the duty of loyalty leaving only the duties of care and loyalty as stand-alone,
independent duties); see also Stephen Bainbridge, Good Faith in Delaware After Stone v.
Ritter, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE’S J. L., RELIGION, POL., & CULTURE (Jan. 3, 2007),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2007/01/good-faith-in-dela
ware-after-stone-v-ritter.html [https://perma.cc/BF48-M2SU].
220
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 125 (2d ed. 2009).
221
See Barker, supra note 31, at 200–02.
222
See Wallace, supra note 179, at 764.
223
Stone, 911 A.2d at 371. The decision is not without its critics, with Bainbridge
stating that this intentional failure to act constituting a breach of the duty of loyalty guts the
business judgment rule. See Stephen Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter: Directors Caremark
Oversight Duties, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE’S J. L., RELIGION, POL., & CULTURE (Jan. 3, 2007),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2007/01/stone-v-ritterdirectors-caremark-oversight-duties.html [https://perma.cc/NY4V-2NVF] [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter].
224
Stone, 911 A.2d at 368–71 (applying In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)). The “Caremark’ duties” are often referred to as
the fiduciary duty of oversight. See Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 223 (noting that
Stone v. Ritter reinterprets the Caremark duties of oversight as duties of good faith and
loyalty and not those of care).
225
See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. The Caremark case illustrated that, in limited
circumstances, high profile oversight failures could be regarded as not just gross negligence
by directors but instead as acts of disloyalty for sustainable or systemic failure to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists, and illustrates the increasing importance
of board function under Delaware law, as well as the need for the Board to be fully informed.
Wallace, supra note 179, at 761 (noting, however, that the subsequent Citigroup derivative
action suit, In Re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A 2d 106 (Del. Ch.
2009), casts doubt on the Caremark approach). Marc Moore highlights how difficult this
threshold is to reach in Delaware Courts in the area of systemic risk oversight, citing the
Citigroup shareholder derivative litigation. See Marc T. Moore, Redressing Risk Oversight
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disregard will demonstrate that they have not discharged their fiduciary obligations
in good faith.226 Similarly, according to the Delaware Supreme Court in In Re Walt
Disney Company Derivative Litigation (the Disney case),227 acts of bad faith include
where a director intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the
best interests of the corporation, where she acts with the intention to violate
applicable law or intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for her duties.228 Combined, these duties of care
and loyalty focus the courts’ attention on whether the director was fully informed,
disinterested, and independent in her decision making.
The business judgment rule is a largely process-based rule as defined in
Delaware, and used by courts to assess directors’ decisions and whether those
decisions complied with their directors’ duties.229 Under this rule, the court is not
concerned with the content of the decision made by a director, but instead with the
process by which the decision was made.230 Absent illegality, fraud or self-dealing,
courts under the business judgment rule presume that directors have employed their
own appropriate business judgment to the issue at hand.231 The court will assess “the
good faith or rationality of the process employed.”232 However, as a result of this
emphasis on process, even if the outcome is ill-advised, courts are unlikely to
Failure in UK and US Listed Companies: Lessons from the RBS and Citigroup Litigation,
18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 733, 743–46 (2017) (noting that security disclosure violations
may be a more successful route to addressing systemic risk failures by directors than
directors’ duties). Hill notes that while liability for breach of the Caremark duties would face
significant obstacles, the soft law ‘penumbra’ of the case has and will encourage compliance
action by directors. See generally Claire Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 681
(2018) (noting that while liability for breach of the Caremark duties would face significant
obstacles, the soft law ‘penumbra’ of the case has and will encourage compliance action by
directors).
226
See In Re Caremark Intl. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch.
1996).
227
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
228
Id. at 67. Wallace notes that Stone v. Ritter requires that directors must have been
conscious of the fact they were not monitoring and requires ‘persistent indolence’ on their
party in order for a claim of oversight failure to be successful, although he notes the duty of
oversight is distinguishable from the duty of care to take decisions on strategic climate action.
Wallace, supra note 179, at 761.
229
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Stone, 911 A.2d at 370; In
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 970–71; Hanson Tr. PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F. 2d 264, 274–76 (2d Cir. 1986); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
262–64 (Del. 2000).
230
See Stone, 911 A.2d at 367.
231
See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255.
232
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967. Elhauge argues that the
business judgment rule was established as courts could not figure out what maximizes
profits, and so rely on directors to do so. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in
the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 743 (2005).
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intervene, provided the director’s decision is the product of good faith and a rational
process.233 Fershee notes that the increasing focus on profitmaking by directors may
narrow directors’ decision-making power.234 He notes that this increasing turn in
Delaware towards profitability may convert the business judgment rule away from
an abstention rule to a more intrusive standard assumed by courts, marking a
significant departure from its historical interpretations.235
There is a presumption that, in order to benefit from the business judgment rule,
directors must have informed themselves of all material information and acted with
care on the basis of that information.236 Directors should also act in accordance with
their duties of loyalty and care.
The case of Pfeffer v. Redstone237 established that making a materially false or
misleading statement to shareholders can violate state law fiduciary duties.238 In the
securities law context, according to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Omnicare,
Inc. v. Laborers District Council Constr. Ind. Pens. Fund,239 directors breach their
duty of loyalty if their statements to shareholders are not honest, and this includes
where the directors’ opinion is not honestly held.240 If facts such as the risks of
climate change to the business are either held by the company or are within the
knowledge of directors, and would undermine any opinion given by directors to
shareholders, this could lead to personal liability for breach of the duty of loyalty.241
233

See Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 223.
Joshua P. Fershee, The End of Responsible Growth and Governance?: The Risks
Posed by Social Enterprise Enabling Statutes and the Demise of Director Primacy, 19 TENN.
J. BUS. L. 361, 363 (2018) (pointing out there is no reason for a community service mission
to itself to not serve the purpose of promoting the value of the corporation for the benefit of
its shareholders).
235
Id.
236
See Robert T. Miller, Wrongful Omissions by Corporate Directors: Stone v. Ritter
and Adapting the Process Model of the Delaware Business Judgement Rule, 10 U. PA. J.
BUS. & EMP. L. 911, 912–13 (2008) (noting that violation of directors’ duties for omission is
one of the most difficult to prove, depending on whether a director failed to consider acting
at all, or considered an action and then decided not to act).
237
965 A.2d 676 (Del. 2009).
238
Id. at 684.
239
Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct.
1318, 1327 (2015).
240
See id. Although Omnicare expressly examined the disclosure requirements of
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, these statutory disclosure requirements and the
Omnicare decision implicate state law fiduciary duties. See Hillary A. Sale & Donald C.
Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance,
66 DUKE L. J. 763, 773, 768–88 (2016).
241
See generally David Estrin & Cynthia A. Williams, Hearing Before the Philippines
Human Rights Commission, New York (Sept. 28, 2018) (on file with author). Cynthia A.
Williams and David Estrin submitted a summary of recommended measures to the
Philippines Commission on Human Rights Inquiry at the hearing in New York on September
28, 2018 outlining a number of legal obligations of officers and directors of carbon major
234
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At the pleadings stage, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
in Ramirez paid significant attention to the Omnicare decision in the context of
material misstatements made by officers of ExxonMobil.242 While Exxon attempted
to rely on the Omnicare decision by characterizing its asset valuations and
impairment statements as opinions only, the court was clear that if underlying facts
are not provided to shareholders, and contradict statements made, that can render
directors’ statements misleading by omission.243 The Ramirez court noted that,
according to the Omnicare standard, even if the speaker genuinely holds opinions
expressed, it could still constitute a material misstatement by omission if the speaker
omits material facts about the speaker’s inquiry into or knowledge concerning a
statement of opinion if those omitted facts conflict with what a reasonable investor
would take from the statements.244 Based on a Fifth Circuit decision, which held that
alleged accounting violations are sufficient to plead material misstatements, the
Ramirez court stated that ExxonMobil’s officers’ alleged GAAP violations and
opinions regarding the Rocky Mountain Dry Gas Operation not being impaired
necessarily omitted particular facts which made their opinions materially
misleading.245 The officers’ positions on the board and their familiarity with the
proxy cost for carbon used by the company exposed them to a potential breach of
their directors’ duties.246
Increased litigation and escalating climate risks, therefore, have legal
implications for directors’ and officers’ liability. Impact litigation against carbonmajor corporations raises the risk metrics of climate change for their businesses, and
also raises the profile of climate change for directors and investors. Directors will
breach their duties of care and loyalty if they fail to understand the risks of climate
change to their business and, where these risks are considerable, have failed to
convey these risks to shareholders. Barker and Winter note that the law “does not
tolerate decisions based on uninformed assumptions, or that arise by default from a
failure to turn the directional mind to a relevant issue.”247 Directors will also be liable
if they utterly failed to implement a reporting and information system which is
enterprises and their investors, as well as recommended voluntary actions by these entities,
including committing to corporate policies and actions to achieve emission reductions and
decarbonisation of their primary energy supplies, develop specific business plans and
investment allocation to ensure peaking of carbon emissions by 2020 using minimum
disclosure expectations set out in a 2018 report of the Transition Pathway Initiative, and to
have the plans peer-reviewed. They recommend these actions be backstopped by government
requirements. Id.
242
Ramirez v. ExxonMobil, 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 839 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
243
Id. at 848.
244
Id. at 847–48.
245
Id. at 848 (citing Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 257–58 (5th Cir.
2006)).
246
Id. at 851–54.
247
Sarah Barker & Kurt Winter, Changing Balance of Evidence, ESG MAGAZINE,
Winter 2016, at 46.
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commensurate with corresponding risks to the business and legal obligations, or, if
having implemented such a system, they consciously failed to monitor or oversee its
operations, thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems
requiring their attention.248 Both limbs of the test require a showing that directors
knew they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations in order for liability to be
imposed.249 Barker notes that, in relation to stranded assets, directors who
consciously disregard or are willfully blind to stranded asset risks through, for
example, ‘default denialism’ consistent with industry-based or partisan political
affiliations, may be subject to a claim that they failed to discharge their duty to
prioritize the best interests of the company.250 A changing balance of evidence from
science suggests that a shift is occurring from climate change being seen merely as
an ethical concern, to a significant financial concern for carbon-major corporations
and their investors, meaning directors are legally obligated to consider climate
risks.251 Directors would have direct and actual notice of climate risk as a result of
regulatory investigations or litigation brought against their own company, and
potentially by suits brought against other fossil fuel corporations.252 While Ramirez
has just passed the pleadings stage, the case provides an important example of how
existing fiduciary duties could require directors of public companies with securities
duties to disclose information to shareholders about climate change and climate risk.
The rise of this second wave of litigation, therefore, increases the materiality of
the risks of climate change to businesses and investors in those businesses and
consequentially affects corporate governance. According to the Omnicare decision,
directors will be at risk of breaching the duty of loyalty if they do not act
appropriately with their shareholders, meaning they should inform their shareholders
of the transition risks of climate change.253 Transition risks include increased
regulation on climate change, which may affect the bottom lines of these
businesses.254 Increased disclosure by directors to investors of both the material
financial risks of climate change as well as transition risks are also being demanded
by investors independent of litigation through shareholder proposals submitted at

248

See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). Stone involved the lack of
implementation of a risk-based system in relation to anti-money laundering legal obligations
and knowledge by the directors that they were not complying with their fiduciary duties is a
requirement. This obligation will be more relevant where directors have legal obligations
around emissions. See Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 223.
249
Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 223.
250
Barker, supra note 31, at 211.
251
Barker & Winter, supra note 247, at 46.
252
Barker, supra note 31, at 212–13.
253
See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund, 135 S.
Ct. 1318, 1327 (2015); see also supra discussion in note 240.
254
See supra Section III.A.
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annual general meetings (AGMs).255 Directors are unlikely to be able to ward off
shareholder proposals, and the issue is likely to remain an agenda item at AGMs.
In April and May 2015, at the AGMs of both BP and Royal Dutch Shell,
shareholder resolutions supported by a majority of shareholders as well as by
management were passed.256 The shareholder resolutions requested enhanced
reporting by these corporations on their exposure to climate change, including
portfolio resistance to the International Energy Agency’s 2030 energy scenarios.257
They also requested further information on operational environmental management
and public policy positions on climate change.258 The resolutions were submitted
specifically in light of the Paris Agreement negotiations.259 The reasoning behind
the shareholder resolution, as shared by “Aiming for A,” was to understand how
these corporations were preparing for the low-carbon transition, reveal systemic
risks that may impact investors, and engage in more collective fiduciary duties and
enhance shareholder voice on climate change.260
In 2015 and 2016, similar resolutions requesting more action on climate
change, including increased disclosure and the long-term portfolio impacts of
climate change regulations and policies, were put forward at the AGMs of
ExxonMobil and Chevron.261 The Exxon resolution was not accepted by the majority
of shareholders.262 Shareholders did, however, pass a resolution that could enable
them to appoint board members with expertise in climate change.263 In 2017,
shareholders of Occidental Petroleum approved a shareholder proposal requiring
that the company disclose the business impacts of climate change.264 This vote marks

255
See, e.g., AIMING FOR A COALITION, SPECIAL RESOLUTION – STRATEGIC RESILIENCE
FOR 2035 AND BEYOND (2015), https://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/resources_attachmen

ts/royaldutchshell2015resolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZQ2-36UE].
256
Megan Darby, BP Adopts Climate Risk Proposal After Shareholder Vote, CLIMATE
CHANGE NEWS (Apr. 16, 2015, 3:02 PM), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/04/16/
bp-adopts-climate-risk-proposal-after-shareholder-vote/ [https://perma.cc/EV8F-W46G].
257
AIMING FOR A COALITION, supra note 255.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Karen Savage, Climate Proposals Fail at Exxon, Chevron Shareholder Meetings,
CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (May 29, 2019), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2019/05/
29/climate-proposals-exxon-chevron/ [https://perma.cc/RA3U-RD55].
262
Id.
263
Rupert Neate, ExxonMobil CEO: Ending Oil Production ‘Not Acceptable for
Humanity,’ GUARDIAN (May 25, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/
2016/may/25/exxonmobil-ceo-oil-climate-change-oil-production [https://perma.cc/2M99SNGP].
264
Emily Chasan, Occidental Holders Override Board in Approving Climate Proposal,
BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2017, 8:02 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201705-12/blackrock-to-back-climate-shareholder-proposal-at-occidental [https://perma.cc/4Y
VF-ZNMV].
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the first time that a climate-related shareholder resolution was passed over the
objections of the board.265
A number of carbon-major corporations, including Exxon, in relation to the
2016 shareholder resolutions, applied to the SEC under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) requesting
permission to exclude these proposals from proxy materials to be circulated to
shareholders on the basis that they were vague or indefinite.266 The SEC, in all cases,
disagreed, meaning that these corporations had to include the shareholder proposals
in proxy materials, allowing all shareholders to vote on them.267 Renssen notes that
climate litigation has been given a “new lease on life” partly due to these shareholder
actions targeting carbon-majors.268
265

It is important to note that shareholder proposals on their own are not binding on the
corporation. In November 2019, the SEC proposed amendments to, among other things,
increase the thresholds of shareholder eligibility to submit proposals under Rule 14a-8(b).
See generally SEC Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange
Act Rule 14a-8, 84 Fed. Reg. 66458 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
Part 240) (The rule was proposed by the Commission on Nov. 5, 2019, but was not published
in the Federal Register until Dec. 4, 2019. See id. at 66515).
266
Exxon Mobil Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2019/adamseitchik040219-14a8.
pdf [https://perma.cc/527Z-MQQC].
267
However, the SEC allowed the company to reject a shareholder submission
requesting ExxonMobil to set emissions targets consistent with the Paris Agreement. See
Gary McWilliams, U.S. Regulator Rules Out Exxon Shareholder Vote on Climate
Resolution, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2019, 2:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaexxon-mobil-climatechange/u-s-regulator-rules-out-exxon-shareholder-vote-on-climateresolution-idUSKCN1RE2E5 [https://perma.cc/Y5Z6-8DQV].
268
Renssen, supra note 60, at 655. In 2010, the SEC issued guidance to investors
regarding disclosures obligations in the context of climate change. Commission Guidance
Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6296 (Feb. 8, 2010)
(interpreting 17 C.F.R. pts 211, 231, 241). The SEC guidance lists several disclosure
obligations which may be relevant, including Securities Act Rule 408 and the Exchange Act
Rule 12b-20, which requires registrants to disclose further “material” information as may be
necessary to ensure that statements are not misleading. Commission Guidance Regarding
Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6293–94. In Basic v. Levinson, the
U.S. Supreme Court deemed a consideration to be material “if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” 485 U.S.
224, 231 (1988). While there has been very little action by the SEC in relation to its 2010
guidance, the legal requirement to disclose under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§
77d-1(a)(4), (5) (2012), remains. The Act requires disclosure of material information which
would ensure that the filing was not “misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.301(b) (2019). Further,
the increasing number of extra-judicial resolutions submitted by shareholders against carbon
major corporations requesting disclosure of the risks of climate change may exemplify that
climate change itself is now considered material by shareholders. In addition, Item 103 of
Regulation S-K requires a registrant to briefly describe any material pending legal
proceedings to which it or its subsidiaries may be a party to. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2019).
Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of Management’s Discussion and Analysis
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Fiduciary duties not only require directors to identify and assess climate risks
but can also provide tools for directors to consider and address the risks of climate
change. Heminway notes that corporate law in the social enterprise context remains,
at least in some states, a very flexible legal tool.269 She states that corporate law
provides sufficient flexibility to directors in for-profit companies to consider what
is best for shareholders in the long term, and can incorporate social enterprise
approaches that consider shareholder wealth maximization.270
E. Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Climate Risk
The shareholder wealth maximization norm is often seen as a barrier to climate
action, but in fact, the norm is primarily focused on the long-term profitability of the
corporation. It is the most dominant norm undergirding U.S. corporate law and
fiduciary duties in particular.271 While not reflected in statutory obligations, its
of Financial Conditions and Results of Operations (or MD&A) to enable investors to see the
registrant entity from the perspective of management. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2019) (Item 303).
This statement should identify known trends, events, demands and uncertainties that are
reasonably likely to have a material effect on the financial condition or operating
performance of the registrant. Id. § 229.303(a)(1). The SEC guidance notes that the time
horizon is not specified for the MD&A analysis and will depend on the registrant’s particular
circumstances. 75 Fed. Reg. at 6290, 6296. The risk factors assessed should include
regulation, scientific and technological updates, as well as physical risks of climate change.
See id.; see also Wallace, supra note 179, at 776 (noting that directors may determine that
litigation risk does not reach the level of materiality that would require disclosure under Item
103 of Regulation S-K, assuming the litigation may not succeed due to causation hurdles,
but that the MD&A disclosures may be a more potent tool for climate change disclosures,
and that combined with political, economic and “advocacy-driven public consciousness,”
federal securities law could be the “main impetus for corporate action”).
269
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up on Traditional For-Profit
Corporations for Sustainable Social Enterprise, 86 UMKC L. REV. 779, 786 (2018).
270
Id.
271
There are a variety of theoretical normative approaches to the objective of the
corporation. Shareholder primacy was originally based on shareholders as owners of the
company or, alternatively according to agency theorists, that shareholders own residual
claims over corporate assets. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 45, at 1436. The ownership
theory has been supplanted by the nexus of contracts or contractarian theories, which evolved
from Coase’s transactional costs theories, and generally characterise the corporation as a
nexus or series of default contracts, and particularly as a species of private law. Id. at 1430.
For a description of the varieties of theoretical approaches in the contractarian vein, see
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 45, at 606. For a critique of this approach to the
corporation, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1527 (1989). Contractarian theories are
not uncontested. Lipton and Rosenblum contest the private characterization of corporations,
pointing to their ties to the state and public welfare histories. In particular, they put forward
an alternative model of the corporation as an entity, having its own independent interests in
long-term business success. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of
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normative power is still considerable, and it has been deemed a “fundamental norm”
guiding corporate decision making, particularly in Delaware. Fershee has noted that
recent Delaware cases and judicial writings have elevated this norm to a more
“singular and narrow obligation for for-profit entities.”272 Norms are powerful tools
in corporate law. Corporate actors, such as directors, are often influenced by
corporate culture and norm-based standards.273 So while often criticized, it is
important to determine where synergies or complementarities between shareholder
wealth maximization and climate risks to corporations can be found.
Contractarian theory characterizes the corporation as a nexus or series of
private, default contracts or reciprocal arrangements between constituents who have
a stake in its operations and profitability.274 As these contracts are necessarily
incomplete, fiduciary duties stand as “gap fillers,” available to courts where cracks
or holes in these contracts between shareholders and corporate officers and directors
appear. 275 The hypothetical bargain analysis asks what contractual terms rational
parties would have agreed to had they addressed these gaps ex ante, and the
prevailing theoretical view is that they would have agreed to maximize shareholder
value.276 The purpose of fiduciary duties and the shareholder wealth maximization
norm that guides their application, according to contractarians, is to focus the loyalty

Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187,
189, 202–03 (1991). Blair and Stout also put forward the team production theory, where
directors focus instead on key contributors, which provide valuable inputs to the firm. See
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247, 249–55 (1999).
272
Fershee, supra note 234, at 362 (attributing this increased focus partly on the rise of
social enterprise corporate forms, but also to the general decline of director primacy towards
a more intrusive interpretation of the business judgment rule by the courts in Delaware).
273
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, Introduction,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608 (2001).
274
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts,
and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822–23 (1999). There is some debate
whether the corporation in this approach is itself the nexus of contracts or is separate and
apart from the nexus of contracts. For example, Bainbridge argues that the corporation is a
nexus of contracts. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 45, at 553. Hessen also argues
that the corporation is not an entity, but instead a group of contracting individuals. See Robert
Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1336 (1979).
275
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 45, at 586; see also Jonathan R. Macey,
An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 41 (1991).
276
Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional
Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 217 (2000). There are clear critiques
of this approach. See, e.g., LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012).
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of directors towards shareholders.277 Shareholders are reified and elevated in this
characterization of the corporation through a hypothetical bargain analysis.
Shareholder wealth maximization appears as the majoritarian default rule or the
governing principle that the majority of participants in this hypothetical bargain
would choose.278
According to many contractarians, the role of shareholder wealth maximization
is to seek long-term shareholder value or gain.279 However, Jensen describes the
ultimate goal of the corporation in terms of the firm and not shareholder value. He
states that the value maximization norm means that corporate managers should make
all decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of the firm.280 Allen et
al. describe one possible aim of corporate law as being to achieve the best results for
stockholders, based on the property model of the corporation that generates value
for the entity in the long term.281 Delaware law has embraced the property model of
the corporation as an entity, which still incorporates shareholder wealth
maximization, but in a form that emphasizes long-term wealth maximization by
reinforcing some powers of corporate directors.282
Hansmann and Kraakman describe the primary aim of corporate law as striving
to increase long-term shareholder value.283 However, the definition of shareholder
value is often unclear.284 Shareholders represent a shifting class of investors, some
with long term and others with short term profit profiles. It is difficult for managers
to determine the time and risk preferences of existing and future shareholders.285 As
277

Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 45, at 1441.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 45, at 573.
279
Id. at 583.
280
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate
Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 3, 12 (2002) (defining the value of the firm as
the sum of all financial claims on firms including equity, debt, warrants and preferred stock).
281
William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the
Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2002).
282
Id. at 1079; see also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the
Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 272–75 (1992) (noting that, historically,
theories of wealth maximization have ‘papered over’ the conflict over the conceptual
approaches of the corporation by invoking what he calls a murky distinction between longterm profit maximization and short-term profit maximization).
283
Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, supra note 45, at
439–41.
284
See Hemingway, supra note 167, at 970–71 n.90 (noting that value can often be a
broader term than wealth maximization, with the latter often focusing solely on profit
whereas shareholder can value a number of outputs in addition to profits).
285
Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. REV. 277, 287 (1990) (noting that directors must satisfy both widows and orphans
seeking sure and immediate succor as well as cowboy capitalists waiting for a bigger score);
Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 27, 37 (1996) (explaining that shareholders diverge in their interests in several ways
including long-term versus short term, diversified versus non-diversified, and individual
278
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a result, directors may seek to maximize share price, but markets are not always
efficient in terms of absorbing and assessing information.286 As Keay notes, the
strong version of the efficient market hypothesis states that the share price will
automatically take into account all public and private information at any given time
about the corporation, and the semi-strong version takes into account all public
information.287 Therefore, while descriptions of shareholder wealth maximization
often incorporate a long-term view, its application does not always (or even
typically) clearly distinguish between shareholder value and share price, or provide
guidance to directors on whether their focus should be on share value or overall firm
value.288
Reliance solely on share price depends on the efficient market hypothesis – that
markets accurately, efficiently, and timely absorb and assess all relevant information
about the corporations.289 Stout describes this as the “Achilles heel” of the
hypothesis because it is not clear how information flows into share price
valuation.290 Market prices may not closely reflect actual expected risks and returns.
Therefore, the use of share price alone as a decisional tool may encourage
mismanagement of assets by directors in favor of short-term returns.291 Markets are
not very good at assessing and taking into account long-term systemic risk.292
Information that is complex or difficult to acquire may take a long time to be
versus institutional); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder
Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 83–85 (2008) (noting several ways in which shareholder
interests can diverge with specific differences of alignment between short-term and longterm investors and their potential alignment with stakeholders); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735,
1745 (2006) (arguing that “[a]ll organizations must have some mechanism for aggregating
the preferences of the organization’s constituencies and converting them into collective
decisions,” and that “[a]uthority-based decisionmaking structures . . . tend to arise when the
firm’s constituencies face information asymmetries and have differing interests”).
286
See Hu, supra note 285, at 357–58.
287
Andrew Keay, Getting to Grips with the Shareholder Value Theory in Corporate
Law, 39 COMM. L. WORLD REV. 358, 369–70 (2010); Id. at 375 (questioning in the social
context whether share prices are an appropriate proxy for societal values).
288
Hu, supra note 285, at 295–300.
289
Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28. J. CORP. L. 635, 639–40 (2003).
290
Id. at 637; see also id. at 659–60 (noting that informational efficiency is the speed
at which prices respond to information, but that this theory assumes a homo economicus
model of human behaviour—that people are rational actors with stable preferences who
promote their own welfare).
291
Id. at 657.
292
The financial crisis of 2008 illustrates these failings. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
On the Receipt of the Ronald H. Coase Medal: Uncertainty, the Economic Crisis, and the
Future of Law and Economics, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 265, 278 (2010); U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development, Corporate Governance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis:
Selected International Views, 59–63, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/ED/2010/2 (2010).
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absorbed into the share price and may never be fully absorbed.293 This is particularly
the case in the context of climate change and climate risk – businesses are generally
not accurately accounting for and incorporating the significant, short-, medium-, or
long-term risks of climate change to their business.294
Despite the significant levels of risk facing corporations due to climate change,
short-termism still persists with the reliance on efficient capital market theories that
blur or dismiss the distinction between short-term and long-term interests.295 The
impacts of climate change are already affecting companies in terms of increased
operational costs, disrupted production, plant shutdowns, worker absences due to
extreme events, as well as compromised assets.296 Because the impacts of climate
change are only predicted to worsen in the coming decades, companies must shift
from an incrementalist adaptation approach to transformational and long-term
approaches to decision-making and disclosures on climate risk and climate
change.297 This requires long-term thinking, and the ability to manage large time
scales and complex information on climate change and to adapt these into smaller
pieces of information that can be absorbed into industry sectors and individual
corporate strategies. Directors will need guidance and expertise to do this, and they
must adopt long-term thinking.298
293

Stout, supra note 289, at 656.
THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 29, at 3; WORLD ECON. FORUM &
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(2019),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Creating_effective_climate_governance_on_corpora
te_boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD95-CAB7] [hereinafter WEF & PwC]; Goldstein et. al.,
supra note 171, at 18.
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See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 271, at 203. See generally Eduard Gracia,
Corporate Short-Term Thinking and the Winner Takes All Market (Oct. 28, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.445260 [https://perma.cc/ADC95UAC] (discussing the impact of corporate short-term thinking); David Millon, Shareholder
Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 911 (2013); Daniel M. Gallagher,
Activism, Short-Termism and the SEC: Remarks at the 21st Annual Stanford Directors’
College (June 23, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-short-termism-and-thesec.html [https://perma.cc/3MS6-4PT7]; Leo E. Strine Jr., One Fundamental Corporate
Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless
Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAWYER 1, 10–12
(2010).
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Id. at 23.
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The Center for American Progress (CAP) recently petitioned the SEC to create a
standard disclosure for environmental, social, and governance indicators. Letter from
Cynthia A. Williams et al., to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, SEC, Petition for a Rulemaking on
Environmental,
Social,
and
Governance
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(Oct.
1,
2018),
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While the shareholder wealth maximization norm is commonly interpreted as
allowing directors to take a long-term view, systemic market forces that tend towards
short-termism still have a powerful grip over the norm’s application. Therefore,
fiscal incentives, along with broader and deeper regulatory changes on corporate
emissions, are required for swift and effective transitions away from fossil fuels.
Despite these disincentives, fiduciary duties as currently interpreted are sufficiently
flexible to allow directors to take into account the risks of climate change to their
businesses and take a longer-term perspective on value creation that incorporates the
risks and opportunities of energy transitions. In particular, fiduciary duties as guided
by the shareholder wealth maximization norm at the very least require directors to
be informed of and take into account the risks of climate change to their businesses.
Barker notes that as climate risks have evolved to become an issue of financial
import for many corporations, assessing climate risk is not only consistent with but
is now a prerequisite to the maximization of wealth.299 In addition, directors’ views
on maximization of wealth may be changing. In August 2019, the Business
Roundtable (a group of CEOs of approximately 200 of the largest U.S. corporations)
issued a statement on the purpose of the corporation, which differed significantly
from all of their previous statements issued since 1997 which had all focused
primarily on shareholders. In the 2019 statement, a commitment to all stakeholders
is emphasized, as well as a focus on generating long-term value for shareholders.300
termism as a key obstacle preventing shareholders and other stakeholders access to the longterm information they need to assess the long-term stability of their target investments in the
context of climate change. Id. The CAP report connects the detrimental effect of short-term
profit making in the context of the shareholder wealth maximization norm to the issue of
climate change. ANDY GREEN & ANDREW SCHWARTZ, CORPORATE LONG-TERMISM,
TRANSPARENCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/economy/reports/2018/10/02/458891/corporate-long-termism-transparency-publicinterest [https://perma.cc/5BC2-RAP3]. The SEC response in its guidance note on
Modernizing Regulation S-K notably excluded any standardized requirement for reporting
on climate change. See Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, ‘Modernizing’ Regulation S-K:
Ignoring the Elephant in the Room,’ U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-mda-2020-01-30 [https://perma.cc/244XMZNQ].
299
Barker, supra note 31, at 205.
300
See Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (Aug. 19,
2019), https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/BRT-State
ment-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures.pdf [perma.cc/63LU-44PU]; see
also Press Release, Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a
Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’ (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corpor
ation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/A4MP-8CKG]
(explaining that previous statements—which had endorsed a concept that corporations exist
principally to serve their shareholders—no longer accurately describe the ways in which
CEOs endeavor to create value for all stakeholders, whose long-term interests are
inseparable).
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While increasing litigation on climate change has raised the profile of climate
risks, and fiduciary duties provide sufficient flexibility to directors to assess and
consider climate risk, several barriers still remain. One such barrier is the structure
of corporate groups, as will be discussed in the next section. Shareholders of
companies enjoy limited liability, meaning that shareholders, absent certain
circumstances, are not liable for debts incurred by the corporation in which they hold
shares.301 These shareholders may themselves be corporations, called parent
corporations, and together they form a corporate group.302 Limited liability is one of
the hallmarks of corporate law, and only when courts decide to pierce the corporate
veil will limited liability not apply to parent companies.303 Climate litigation against
subsidiary companies may encounter difficulties in attempting to fix liability on the
parent companies due to the firmly entrenched system of segregating liability into
individual corporate entities within a corporate group structure. As a result, climate
policies decided by the parent company and applied to subsidiary companies may
not attract liability at the parent level.
F. Corporate Group Structures – A Barrier to Climate Liability?
One area which has received less attention in this recent spate of cases is the
role of the corporate group structure in terms of liability. In many of these cases, the
parent company has been the focus of liability. However, large corporations often
segregate jurisdictional activity into separate legal entities within a corporate group
structure to purposefully disaggregate liability away from the parent company, even
if the profits are issued via dividends up to it.304 Firms facing higher litigation risk
often tend to have more subsidiaries.305 The separate liability of corporate actors
within group structures has long been established in law.306 But liability can be
overcome by courts piercing the corporate veil, imposing liability on parent
companies for debts of their subsidiaries. Common law jurisdictions such as the
United States and the United Kingdom use similar tests for piercing the corporate
301
302

Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 45, at 1428.
PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW 52

(1993).
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Id. at 59.
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James A. Ligon & James Malm, Litigation Risk, Financial Distress, and the Use of
Subsidiaries, 67 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 255, 256 (2018).
306
See Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.);
Adams v. Cape Indus. [1990] Ch 433 (C.A.). The U.S. jurisdiction has also had a spate of
cases which demonstrate that piercing the veil within corporate groups is difficult. See, e.g.,
Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 10 (N.Y. 1966); Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co., 186
F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was
lacking due to lacking evidence of defendant’s business dealings in Texas). But see OTR
Assocs.’ v. IBC Servs., Inc., 801 A.2d 407, 412 (App. Div. 2002) (finding the veil pierced
when fraud is present).
304
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veil, including: the alter ego test; the test of whether there has been complete
domination by a parent company of a subsidiary company; the test of whether the
parent has abused the privilege of incorporation; and the single business enterprise
doctrine.307
A recent case in the United Kingdom illustrates how difficult piercing the veil
can be in the carbon-major group structure. The case of HRH Emere Godwin Bebe
Okpabi308 highlights the relevance of this doctrine in the context of climate change
litigation. Here, the claimants were seeking damages as a result of serious and
ongoing pollution from leaks of oil from a pipeline in the Niger Delta from the parent
company of the Royal Dutch Shell group.309 The local subsidiary, Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (RDS), and its subsidiary, SPDC, were also
respondents. The claimants claimed negligence under the common law of Nigeria,
which is the same as the common law test in the United Kingdom, and brought a suit
in the English courts, which was appealed to the Court of Appeal.310 The Court of
Appeal considered the 3-part test of the duty of care as foreseeability, proximity, and
reasonableness, and considered that a parent company could owe a duty of care to
an employee of a subsidiary or a party directly affected by its operations in certain
circumstances: where the parent has taken direct responsibility for devising a
material health and safety policy and its adequacy is the subject of the claim, or the
parent controls the operations which give rise to the claim.311
However, issuing mandatory policies was not sufficient, in the majority’s
opinion, to demonstrate the sufficient nexus of control by the parent over the
operations of the subsidiary.312 The policies in question were at a high level, and
none came close to establishing the sort of proximity necessary to establish a duty
of care. There was, however, a strident dissent by LJ Sales, who noted that RDS did
307

This latter test is more prevalent in the United States. But see Walkovsky, 223 N.E.2d
at 10 (applying alter ego test). In the U.K., despite vigorous attempts by Lord Denning to
establish group liability through a single economic unit theory, subsequent cases since the
1970s have not used this approach.
308
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 191 (appeal taken from EWHC (TCC)) [hereinafter HRH
Emere].
309
Id. at [1].
310
Id. at [3].
311
Lungowe v. Vendanta Res. [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528; [83] (appeal taken from
EWHC (TCC)); see also Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80] (appeal taken
from EWHC (QB)) 525 (imposing liability on a parent company for responsibility for the
health and safety of the subsidiary’s employees where the parent had employed a doctor
whose specific function was to protect the employees, thereby establishing the requisite
nexus of responsibility). In HRH Emere, the issue of proximity was problematic for the court.
The court was concerned about whether RDS was in control of the SPDC operations. Five
elements of the relationship of proximity were examined: mandatory policies, standards and
manuals on engineering design and practice, systems of supervision and oversight, financial
control over SPDC, and a high level of direction and oversight of SPDC’s operations were
exercised by RDS. [86].
312
HRH Emere at [89].
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put in place security, motivated by the negligent management of the pipeline by the
subsidiary and the negative reputational damage this was causing the parent
company.313 He argued that, because RDS directed what steps SPDC should take,
and joint decisions had been taken, this activity was enough to establish a direct and
substantial relationship and, therefore, a pattern of distribution of expertise and
control, which was arguably capable of piercing the corporate veil and meeting the
criteria in Chandler v. Cape.314 The Vice Chancellor was less sanguine, stating
bluntly that the corporate structure itself is specifically designed, and therefore
militates against, requisite proximity being met.315 However, the U.K. Supreme
Court in 2019 accepted jurisdiction to hear the appeal of another case regarding a
claim brought by 1,800 Zambian villagers against U.K.-based Vedanta and its
Zambian subsidiary regarding waste discharges from a copper mine, specifically on
the basis that group policies can, in fact, establish a sufficient nexus of control
between parent and subsidiary.316
These cases on liability by a parent in the group structure are relevant in the
climate change context, as most policies on climate change and emissions reductions
are produced at the parent level, and the issuing of mandatory guidance is clearly
established by this case as not providing a sufficient relationship of proximity. While
a U.K. case, the outcome in relation to mandatory policies is similar to a U.S. case
on piercing the corporate veil.317 In Gardemal v. Westin Hotel,318 a widow attempted
to sue the U.S. parent company of Westin Hotels regarding the death of her husband
while they were staying at a Mexican subsidiary of the hotel chain. The plaintiff
attempted to rely on a number of circumstances, including standard mandatory
policies and practices shared within the group structure, as well as similar
trademarks.319 These were specifically held to be insufficient in establishing the
single business enterprise ground of piercing the corporate veil.320
While many states in the United States use a totality of circumstances test, and
therefore each case is decided on its facts, the use of standard climate policies within
a corporate group on its own,321 and without significant control exercised by the
313

Id. at [163–64] (Sales, L.J., dissenting).
Id. at [165] (citing Chandler, supra note 311)
315
Id. at [196].
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See Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 211–12 (4th Cir. 1991). Kinney Shoe
Company brought an action to recover money owing under a sublease between Kinney and
Industrial Realty Company but brought the suit against the parent company, Polan. The court
considered a totality of circumstances including primarily the undercapitalization of the
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parent company, will likely not be sufficient to fix liability on the parent company.
This means that litigation in jurisdictions where parent corporations are located may
be cut short if litigation is only directed at the parent company and not the local
subsidiary where the harm is being felt. Climate litigation against carbon-major
corporations is therefore not likely to coalesce in the near future into a wave of
successful suits against parent corporations and, therefore, the impacts of litigation
may be muted if parent corporations are not subject to any awards of damages.
IV. WHICH WAY FORWARD FOR DIRECTORS?
Climate risks for corporations are increasing dramatically. As discussed in the
previous sections, litigation is likely to only continue against carbon-major
corporations, and new scientific processes will continue to advance understanding
of these companies’ contributions to climate impacts, thereby increasing the chances
of success of litigation efforts. Climate litigation matters in an era of failing global
governance, as it has the ability to connect different actors and governance scales.322
Climate change has been called a “multi-scalar” problem323 due to the fact that its
governance is found among multiple levels of actors at the local, regional, national
and international levels. Interactions amongst these governance scales are often
problematic, and so litigation can serve a unique governance function, as it “creates
fluid pathways for interactions among regulation at subnational, national, and
international levels.”324 The role of litigation in transnational law is particularly
pertinent for multinational entities such as carbon-major corporations, which have
subsidiaries and/or operations in disparate jurisdictions. Multinational corporations
are sensitive to regulatory changes and progressive judicial decisions in various
jurisdictions due to their global footprints.
Climate change is posing tremendous risks to corporate assets globally.325 The
impacts of climate change will put corporate assets at risk, including their
infrastructure, consumer base, supply chains, and, therefore, business models.
Directors sit in the crosshairs of these emerging impacts, information, and risks, and
they must act. This section highlights the publicity risks of increased litigation, the
links between litigation and directors’ decision-making, as well as some potential
climate-based management strategies that could be adopted by directors in the face
of mounting climate impacts and risks.

subsidiary, a lack of corporate formalities being adhered to, and using the subsidiary as a
shell with no substantial transactions flowing through it, and granted the equitable remedy
of piercing the corporate veil.
322
PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 38, at 53.
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
See supra Section III.A.
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A. Courtrooms as Key Battlegrounds
Courtrooms have become key battlegrounds in the public debate over climate
change.326 As Blumm and Wood note, courts offer a deliberative fact-finding forum
that can balance both scientific and political climate-related concerns.327
Corporatizing climate litigation, therefore, has expository value. It lays bare the
previously secreted role of carbon-major corporations and relates it to the human
pain and suffering, as well as financial costs caused by climate-induced extreme
events. It also exposes the persistent refusal by the most regressive corporations to
act in a societally responsible manner. Many of these corporations have pursued a
self-fulfilling prophecy; the absence of regulation would ensure that fossil fuels
would be a good investment and that corporations would, therefore, maximize their
profits to the detriment of the world.328 As Fromhoff, Heede, and Oreskes note, many
carbon-major corporations “are actively creating the future that they claim to accept
the need to avoid.”329 The public narrative told in these cases is important, and
provides a public forum for “an understanding of social and factual issues [to be]
co-produced and settled.”330 The corollary of this understanding is the proposition
that these corporations are also well placed in terms of their capacities in access to
political power, wealth, technological advancement, and expertise to lead the
transition to clean, safer energy.331
Having shed their previous reluctance to engage with climate science, judicial
actors now recognize the important role that new scientific disciplines play in the
arena of tort law. New scientific processes could also provide progressive judges
with the opportunity to rethink older interpretations of legal and evidentiary
thresholds around tort, burdens of proof and causation, as well as obligations under
corporate law.332 This second wave of climate litigation demonstrates an evolving
global conversation between courts, government actors, private victims, tortfeasors,
directors, and investors in the context of climate change.333 As the negative impacts
of climate change increase, the global responses are likely to increase in a
corresponding fashion.
While political will in the United States may still be lacking at the federal level,
state-based actions have gained traction.334 Federal resistance may also wane as the
326
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impacts of climate change become more severe and apparent, more information is
forthcoming due to improved climate science and corporate disclosures, and carbonmajors begin to spend less money opposing the science on climate change. State and
local actions can also increase the costs of operating for carbon-majors through
increased regulation and permitting processes and enhanced incentives for clean
energy. New scientific processes give climate-focused political groups new tools to
target these companies and increase public pressure. As a result, anti-carbon-major
movements may grow, implicating directors and requiring that they respond to social
media and other public campaigns.
As a public forum to highlight the importance of climate science, courts can
also act as drivers of public and private sector action on climate change, even if the
cases themselves are unsuccessful.335 As Ganguly et al. note, these cases could be
“sublime failures,” achieving the aims of the litigants without achieving judicial
success.336 The simple act of adjudicating climate change can help to shape the
norms and beliefs of the broader public about the importance of climate change, and
the contributory role and responsibilities of carbon-major companies.337 These cases
highlight the importance of the evolving nature of climate risk, even if no damages
or liability awards are ever made.
The public attention these cases garner should capture the attention of
responsible directors, as these litigation trends may lead to shifting social norms and
political contexts. While it is unclear what the causal relationship is between
litigation and strengthened climate governance, enhanced regulatory obligations are
certainly emerging.338 Common standards on disclosure are likely to become global
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STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com [https://perma.cc/7925-9ZLY] (last visited Nov. 1,
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(Apr. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3356024 [https://perma.

2020]

ROAD TO PARIS RUNS THROUGH DELAWARE

375

industry norms, and therefore will affect the nature of what information directors
should both consider and disclose to their shareholders.339 Disclosure obligations
will put the issue of climate change directly on the agendas of AGMs, becoming an
increasing concern for shareholders and, therefore, directors. The impacts of climate
change are costly to corporations, and the bidirectional risk metrics of climate
change should now necessarily inform directorial duties, significantly boosting the
potential contribution of private law to resolving the climate crisis.
B. Connecting Litigation with Directors’ Duties
Legal obligations for corporations in the context of climate change are already
slowly transitioning towards greater liability.340 At the very least, the materiality and
risk thresholds for disclosure and fiduciary considerations for directors are
increasing. The Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) has
issued guidance to assist investors in assessing both the transition plans of the
companies in which they have invested and potential changes in the value of
underlying assets due to climate change.341 If investors perceive increased risks of
climate change to companies, they are likely to push for increased disclosure by
directors and continue to put pressure on directors to address these risks. Directors
may also be under pressure to disclose private governance risks from their emissions,
including reputational risks, supply chain risks, increased customer and investor
cc/UAQ7-HKTS]; Lord Sales, Justice of the U.K. Supreme Court, Directors’ Duties and
Climate Change: Keeping Pace with Environmental Challenges, ANGLO-AUSTRALIAN L.
SOC’Y
(Aug.
27,
2019),
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-190827.pdf
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339
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demands, and financial risks.342 Attorneys may also be at risk of ethics rules
violations if their clients fail to disclose the risks of climate change.343
As impacts and risks materialize more clearly, litigation is likely to increase
and take even more varied forms. Already, industries such as the fishing industry
have started suing carbon-majors for harm from climate change.344 Banks and
international financial institutions are moving away from financing fossil-fuel
intensive activities and industries,345 and if financial institutions become the target
of litigation, carbon-majors could encounter difficulties finding financing for future
activities. Litigation imposes both direct costs on companies of settlements and
attorneys’ fees, but also indirect costs such as investor uncertainty about firm
prospects, loss of customers, suppliers and prestige, and a diversion of management
time and resources.346 Litigation can also affect credit ratings, the cost of debt, and
other financing costs.347 Litigation “will progress as the threat of runaway climate
change materialises” more clearly, and courts are likely to “step in and interpret the
law in a way that meets society’s most urgent demands.”348 However, it should be
noted in the U.S. context that President Trump’s most enduring legacy will be the
appointment of conservative judges.349 These judicial appointments may provide a
342
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dampening effect on climate litigation trends, and any successful district court cases
may have a short shelf life.
Despite this judicial dampening potential, this Article has demonstrated that a
shift is emerging in the context of litigation launched against carbon-major
corporations, with judges engaging more closely with new climate science
processes, litigants becoming more creative, and, consequentially, raising public
consciousness of climate change. This litigation shift is putting direct pressure on
directors’ duties by highlighting the risks of climate change to corporations and is
likely to have several impacts. It will directly affect the procedural elements of
directors’ duties by raising the profile of climate risk and the role and contribution
of carbon-major corporations to climate risk, and by triggering a legal obligation to
both consider and incorporate this information into their decision-making processes.
Litigation may also have more indirect effects by influencing the content of
directors’ decisions if directors take a long-term perspective. The open-textured
nature of directors’ duties allows directors to react to evolving risks and industry
norms. Directors are supposed to be informed and responsible actors, and the
increased profile of climate change risk can no longer be ignored by directors of
corporations that are highly vulnerable to climate risks.
Whether or not tort law adapts to climate change or these cases are successful,
climate change triggers the application of fiduciary duties by the sheer scale of the
risk it poses to businesses. In many instances, climate change is leading to an
adaptation of legal orders and legal reasoning,350 and this will continue to be the case
in the area of corporate law. While corporate law was historically insulated from
environmental concerns, the risks of climate change are becoming so great that
directors can no longer afford to ignore them, or not to pass on risk-based
information to their shareholders. As a result, private law may contribute to better
and more informed climate-decision making by directors and investors on climate
change.
Short-term profit-making has traditionally been the sole focus of many
directors, and in this vein, directors may be reluctant to make long term transition
decisions if short-term costs are incurred due to a short-term approach to shareholder
wealth maximization. As a result, market forces may continue to exert adverse
pressure on directors’ decision making.351 But shareholder wealth maximization
does not require a short-term approach, and directors should pay attention to climate
change not just because of the increasing risks of climate litigation, but because
climate-induced risks and damages are occurring now and are only expected to
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worsen over time, and so it makes good long-term sense for their shareholders.352
Overcoming short-term thinking will be critical for directors to take action on
climate change.
The corporate trend in climate litigation has other, perhaps more indirect,
implications for directors. While concrete legal obligations for corporations may be
in their infant stages, Flynn notes that, even if litigation suits are unsuccessful, they
can persuade corporations to shift assets to more sustainable sources, put pressure
on them to lobby legislatures to develop comprehensive climate change legislation,
and also keep the issue of climate change alive in the public consciousness.353 Private
law could ultimately lead directors to decide to divest assets away from fossil fuels
and re-allocate assets into cleaner energy sources if they use tools available to them.
C. Climate-Based Management Tools and Strategies
While directors may feel overwhelmed by the complexity of climate change,
there are existing steps they can and should take. They should use existing tools
made available by the TCFD to assess the risks of climate change to their business,
including direct and indirect risks. Directors should acquire a more detailed
understanding of the impacts of climate change to broader society in order to
understand and assess systemic risks, indirect risks, impacts on social welfare and
consumption patterns, and the risks of non-linear impacts of climate change. They
should also assess climate-related opportunities.
Several factors impede directors from addressing climate-related risks and
opportunities. These include competing priorities such as cybersecurity, the sheer
complexity of climate change and its systemic nature, and short-term business cycles
and risk assessments.354 While information and climate models are complex,
industry guidance under the TCFD is providing more and more tools to directors and
managers to incorporate climate change more appropriately to their business
strategies. One of these tools is scenario analysis.355 This tool allows directors to
create scenarios to predict the impact of climate change on their existing and future
profitability models. Directors should adopt scenario analysis approaches and
industry-specific guidance provided by the TCFD. While there will be some
temporal dissonances between the long time scales of climate change and the shorter
profit horizons of corporations, scenario analysis provided by the TCFD can help
352

Beate Sjafjell, Beyond Climate Risk: Integrating Sustainability into the Duties of the
Corporate Bond, 23 DEAKIN L. REV. 41, 48–53 (2018) (noting that “shareholder primacy”
and short-term maximisation of returns for shareholders constitute key barriers to boards
addressing not only climate risk but also wider “planetary boundary” risks as well)
[hereinafter Sjafjell, Beyond Climate Risk].
353
Flynn, supra note 68, at 861–63; see also Sjafjell, Beyond Climate Risk, supra note
352, at 56 (noting that the sheer scale of climate litigation regardless of their outcomes should
make them “a driver for change” at the board level).
354
WEF & PwC, supra note 294, at 10.
355
TCFD, supra note 30, at 25–31.

2020]

ROAD TO PARIS RUNS THROUGH DELAWARE

379

directors to manage this dissonance, and craft corporate strategies to better cater for
a variety of time scales which are relevant to their businesses.356 Climate impacts
should no longer be considered as only long-term risks. Climate impacts are
happening now, and directors should assess short-, medium- and long-term impacts.
Directors should also gain a better understanding of the contributions of their
businesses to climate impacts and employ scenario analysis to assess their predicted
emissions against global temperature goals. Carbon-major companies, in particular,
should assess increasing litigation and other transition risks, including in the realm
of securities and corporate law, as well as physical risks to their assets, including
potentially stranded assets. These risks should be disclosed to investors, following
TCFD guidelines.
In addition, the acquisition of knowledge cannot remain static as the accuracy
of the science of climate change and assessment of its impacts increases. Increasing
disclosure requirements also mean that directors should implement appropriate
reporting and information systems, which are kept up to date as the science and
impacts of climate change improve and increase. Failure to monitor and disclose
risks appropriately to shareholders may violate the duty of loyalty and could also
attract litigation from investors. Litigation claims are likely to arise when fiduciary
actors fail to share and disclosure relevant information and risks to shareholders or
fail to take adaptive actions based on their knowledge.357 Litigation aside, investors
are increasingly expecting boards to have fluency with “climate-related risks and
opportunities.”358 As stated above, directors’ duties are open-textured and as a result
do not remain static. The content and requirements of these duties will change as
scientific knowledge about the risks of climate change evolves.
Finally, directors should assess the profitability and feasibility of energy
transitions away from fossil fuels. They should look at both mitigation and
adaptation actions beyond incrementalistic action and consider transformational
actions and the opportunities and reduction of risks they hold.
Directors of all corporations should become aware of the relevance of climate
change to their businesses, and this may involve hiring experts on the board to
achieve this. As the impacts of climate change are only predicted to worsen in the
coming decades, directors must have a clearer understanding of the specific risks
from climate change to their businesses and investigate and prepare for
transformational approaches to climate risk and climate change. This requires that
directors take longer-term perspectives but also a phased approach. In order to do
this, directors need to develop the ability to manage and understand the large time
356
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scales and complex information on climate change. New research is emerging,
which clearly points to the business case for transition, even for carbon-major
corporations.359 Directors should now be both fully aware of the risks that climate
change poses to their business and the opportunities available to them for cleaner
alternative energy production. Directors will need guidance and expertise to do this,
as well as long-term thinking.
Fiduciary duties provide directors with sufficient flexibility to take on the
challenge of climate change.360 However, barriers remain. While the second climate
litigation wave is ostensive, corporate group structures could pose a further barrier
to success against parent companies.361 If litigants and regulators cannot reach the
parent companies, the scope of the second wave’s impact may be diminished. The
interstate nature of emissions may also prove problematic. A myopic focus on shortterm profitability also poses significant barriers to climate action. Even if this second
wave of corporate climate litigation is largely unsuccessful, increased climate risk
combined with shifting industry norms should lead responsible directors to both
cater to and carefully consider the risks climate change poses to their businesses and
shareholder interests.
While climate litigation serves useful purposes as outlined above, other
regulatory changes and fiscal incentives are required, as corporate law alone cannot
tackle the enormous challenges of climate change. But increased climate risks and
impacts also increases public awareness, which is likely to spur on regulatory action.
Directors should consider these shifts and their implications for their businesses.
This Article concludes that while a variety of regulatory and fiscal developments are
needed to provide a more comprehensive approach to climate change, existing
fiduciary duties guided by shareholder wealth maximization norms provide
sufficient flexibility for directors to tackle climate change.
CONCLUSION
The world is facing a climate crisis. Global temperatures are increasing more
rapidly than even once expected and, if emissions remain unabated, we could see
global average temperatures rise by 4ºC (or higher) by the end of the century, and
we have very little time to correct course.362 Crises can and do have impacts on
corporate law. While corporate law remains largely a default set of rules and laws
with few mandatory requirements relating to climate change, regulatory changes are
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often inspired by crises.363 Social and political regimes are reacting to the climate
crisis. Regulatory and fiscal restraints on carbon are starting to emerge, and litigation
against corporations on climate change is escalating and only likely to increase in
the future. While still in their infancy, these changes and movements could be seen
as the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel economy and could herald in a global
transition towards a lower-carbon economy.
Irrespective of the outcomes of existing cases, this new spate of corporate
climate litigation serves a different and perhaps more lasting purpose – it highlights
and publicizes the risks of climate change to directors, investors, and the public.
Directors must take into account increased climate risks when making business
decisions. Existing litigation and regulatory efforts are by no means sufficient, and
larger and broader fiscal instruments and regulatory policies will be needed to usher
in a uniform and swift energy transition. At the same time, markets and, therefore,
corporations are not accurately considering the risks of climate change, or of
transitions away from fossil fuels. Directors should consider and assess escalating
climate risks to their business and should disclose these risks to shareholders where
they are material. Fiduciary duties provide them with sufficient flexibility to take
action on climate change in the interests of their shareholders. Corporate law, along
with new industry guidance and tools, provides directors with the strategies they
require to address the climate crisis. It is in the best interests of shareholders, but
also the public at large, that directors harness the power of corporations to tackle the
climate crisis head-on, before it is too late.
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